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Abstract 
The current global security environment is changing at a faster pace than 
ever before with higher levels of complexity and competitiveness, with a complex 
dynamic of possibilities. The U.S. Navy not only needs more platforms or ships, but 
it needs them with the ability to adapt to changes with new technologies and 
operational concepts. One such concept is that of flexibility in our fleet of ships. To 
successfully implement the Surface Navy’s Flexible Ships concept, PEO-SHIPS 
requires a new methodology that assesses the total future value of various 
combinations of Flexible Ships’ design features and how they will enable affordable 
warfighting relevance over the ship’s full-service life. Examples of Flexible Ships 
design features include decoupling payloads from platforms, standardizing platform-
to-payload interfaces, implementing allowance for rapid reconfiguration of onboard 
electronics and weapons systems, preplanning access routes for mission bays and 
mission decks, and allowing for sufficient growth margins for various distributed 
systems. This research analyzes the application of strategic Real Options Valuation 
methodology within the Integrated Risk Management process to assess the total 
future value of Flexible Ships design features and for use in the Future Surface 
Combatant Analysis of Alternatives. The current research has the explicit goal of 
proposing a reusable, extensible, adaptable, and comprehensive advanced 
analytical modeling process to help the U.S. Navy in quantifying, modeling, valuing, 
and optimizing a set of ship design options to create and value a business case for 
making strategic decisions under uncertainty. 
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I. Introduction 
The current global security environment is changing at a faster pace than 
ever before with higher levels of complexity and competitiveness, with a complex 
dynamic of possibilities. Not only does the U.S. Navy need more platforms or ships, 
but it needs them with the ability to adapt to changes with new technologies and 
operational concepts. One such concept is that of flexibility in our fleet of ships. 
In the Flexible Ships IPT Charter signed out by the nine Flag Officers/SESs 
last year, the IPT is tasked to “make recommendations to leadership for 
policy/process changes that will foster incorporation of flexible ships features into 
current and future ships.” 
The U.S. Navy is tasked with fulfilling its missions globally in environments 
with rapidly changing threats using an equally rapidly evolving technological base of 
platform, mission, electronic, and weapon systems. The challenge the U.S. Navy 
faces is to retain and maintain sufficient military relevance during wartime as well as 
peacetime, with the added goal of minimizing highly intrusive and costly 
modernization throughout a ship’s service life by incorporating Modular Adaptable 
Ships (MAS) and Flexible and Adaptable Ship Options (FASO) in the ship design. 
Accomplishing this goal has the added benefit of allowing the Navy to affordably and 
quickly transform a ship’s mission systems over its service life to maintain its 
required military capabilities (Doerry, 2012). 
The operative term in FASO is flexibility. To have flexibility means to have the 
options to make midcourse corrections and changes as required, when uncertainties 
become resolved over the passage of time, actions, and events. In other words, the 
uncertainties of what future technologies may look like and the ever-changing 
complexity of global threats balanced with the need for the U.S. Navy to be 
responsive and persistent, and to maintain a fleet that provides leaders and 
decision-makers with credible and exercisable options requires flexibility. When 
uncertainties become known, the correct course of action can be implemented, but 
only if the flexibilities exist. Therefore, having flexibility or options in place and ready 
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to execute, by definition, provides value as well as lower overall cost of making 
major ship changes and alterations when the occasion calls for them. 
Having a 355-ship navy is by itself insufficient regarding effectiveness. What 
these platforms are capable of in terms of creating an effect and affecting desired 
outcomes, flexibility to adapt to ever-changing threats, and the ability to incorporate 
evolutionary technology upgrades as they become available are becoming more 
critical. Current levels of technology are insufficient for maintaining maritime 
superiority. New operational concepts and technologies need to be consistently 
updated in our fleet. In most cases, timing is critical. We cannot wait until our 
adversaries have a new technology before testing and implementation begins on our 
end.  
Flexibility and modularity provide the U.S. Navy with the options to execute 
various capabilities quickly. Future flexible ships can be designed such that they are 
modular with rapidly swappable components. New technologies (sensors, weapon 
systems, system upgrades) can be implemented rapidly at lower costs if the ship 
was designed with future flexibility and upgrades in mind. Flexibility is synonymous 
with options. That is, with flexible ships, leadership has the option, but not the 
obligation, to execute any of the available trigger points when conditions make it 
optimal to do so.  
To understand the Flexible Ships concept, one has to first look at its basic 
principles and tenets. Sturtevant (2015) lists the five main tenets of flexible ships, 
including (i) De-coupled Payloads (capabilities) from Platforms (ships); (ii) Standard 
Platform-to-Payload Interfaces––well-defined, common interfaces for distributed ship 
services that are prescribed and managed by the U.S. Navy; (iii) Rapid 
Reconfiguration––specific C5I compartments that can be easily reconfigured with 
upgraded equipment or new systems; (iv) Preplanned Access Routes––used for the 
easy removal and replacement of interior equipment or systems; and (v) Sufficient 
service life allowance growth margins (space and weight for future capabilities, and 
provision for projected demand for distributed systems such as electric power, 
cooling and network bandwidth).  
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Historically, naval ship design has included robust features that limit any 
future capabilities to make requirement changes. For instance, any major 
requirement changes or upgrades needed to meet critical operational tasks during 
wartime would necessitate a major modernization effort or decommissioning the 
existing ship prior to its end of service life and replacing it with a newly 
commissioned ship. The concepts of MAS and FASO, if applied correctly, with the 
optimal options implemented, would reduce the need for costly and lengthy major 
mid–service-life intrusive modernizations, as well as increase the existing platform’s 
flexibility to adapt to new requirements utilizing a faster and cheaper alternative. 
This current research acknowledges that the U.S. Navy has sought out the 
ability to incorporate FASO and MAS capabilities in its ship design of Future Surface 
Combatants (FSCs). Further, the Navy acknowledges that there is significant 
potential value in terms of being able to rapidly upgrade FASO ships at a lower cost, 
while extending the ships’ service life, with the added benefit of being able to quickly 
adapt to changes in both external threats and internal new technologies that offer 
value-added capabilities. As such, this current research is not meant to identify said 
FASO/MAS platforms or payloads per se, but rather, to use previously identified 
platforms, such as the DDG 51 Flight III, where there are opportunities to insert 
flexible ship features. For the purpose of generating a proof of concept example, we 
limit the analysis to said surface combatants in the capability domain of anti-
submarine warfare (ASW).  
This current research focuses on applying a series of analytical 
methodologies, such as Real Options Valuation (ROV), to support development of a 
business model or business case analysis that supports strategic decision-making in 
the context of uncertainty. This analysis identifies, models, values, and optimizes the 
various strategic real options identified for flexible ship designs. Currently, there is 
only a limited set of real-life applications of FASO/MAS in ship design, and they are 
classified; therefore, actual empirical data is not used in this research. In addition, 
because the objective of this research is to illustrate in detail the business case 
modeling process and analytical methodologies such that the method and process 
can be replicated and used in all future FASO/MAS design decisions, subject matter 
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expert (SME) inputs, publicly available information, and a set of basic assumptions 
or rough order magnitude (ROM) estimates are used. The use of the ROM or SME 
inputs, while subjective in nature, in no way detracts from the analytical power, 
efficacy, or applicability of these methods, because the values they supply to the 
model parameters can be replaced with more objective values as they become 
available.  
In summary, this current research has the explicit goal of proposing a 
reusable, extensible, adaptable, and comprehensive advanced analytical modeling 
process to help the U.S. Navy in quantifying, modeling, valuing, and optimizing a set 
of ship design options to support creation of a business case for making strategic 
ship design decisions under uncertainty. The process will accomplish the following: 
 Identify which FASO/MAS options have a positive return on investment 
(i.e., in which options the benefits outweigh the costs).  
 Model uncertainty and risks (i.e., Monte Carlo risk simulations will be 
applied to simulate hundreds of thousands of possible scenarios and 
outcomes to model the volatility and ever-changing global threat matrix). 
 Frame and value the ship design options (i.e., each design option will be 
vetted and modeled; options will be framed in context and valued using 
cost savings [cost savings due to rapid upgrades at lower costs], costs to 
obtain these options [costs to design and implement these FASO/MAS 
options], and potential military benefits [using Knowledge Value Added 
methods to monetize expected military value]). 
 Optimize the portfolio of options (i.e., given a set of FASO/MAS design 
options with different costs, benefits, capabilities, and uncertainties, 
identify which design options should be chosen given constraints in 
budget, schedule, and requirements). 
The current research focuses on Flexible Ships, but its concepts and 
methodologies can be extended to a wide range of possibilities including, but not 
limited to, space, air, surface, undersea, electronic, and cyber warfare. These 
systems and programs can be engineered and designed for rapid future 
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II. Research Process and Layout of the Paper 
The remainder of the current research paper is laid out as follows. 
Literature Review 
A review of the existing literature in terms of the ship design development 
process within the U.S. Navy as well as in other shipbuilding programs is presented 
in this section. First, literature on existing ship design and building processes is 
collected, reviewed, and used to develop a comprehensive ship design and building 
process that is generic and applicable in general across the U.S. Navy ship 
platforms. Second, a collection of the most common types of modular and flexible 
ship design requirements is identified and reviewed. 
The Theories of Strategic Real Options, Knowledge Value Added, and 
Integrated Risk Management 
The recommended decision framework is briefly explained in this section. 
This framework structures the ROV models and methodology in a way that relates to 
the various design implementations and facilitates data collection, data analysis, and 
recommendations, regardless of the design-type alternatives. In addition, the ROV 
analytical modeling method is reviewed as part of the Integrated Risk Management 
(IRM) process, where other advanced analytical decision methodologies such as 
Monte Carlo risk simulation, Knowledge Value Added (KVA), and Portfolio 
Optimization approaches are included. 
Real Options Valuation Applications in the U.S. Department of Defense 
Some quick examples of how ROV can be applied in the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) are outlined to illustrate that ROV methods are not restricted to the 
ship design scope of the current study but can be extended to other DoD acquisition 
investment decision challenges. 
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FASO/MAS at PEO-SHIPS: AWS Options for the DDG 51 Flight III 
This section illustrates the case application of FASO/MAS in the anti-
submarine warfare domain for the DDG 51 Flight III platform. The case begins with 
identifying the design options, then covers the framing and valuation of these 
options, and ends with applying ROV methods within the IRM analytical 
environment. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
This final section details the researcher’s conclusions and recommendations 
regarding the proposed analytical process, data requirements, analyst/engineer 
training, and modeling tools.  
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III. Literature Review 
The concept of FASO is not new to the Navy. In fact, benefits of FASO/MAS 
concepts have been detailed in the mid-1970s by Jolliff (1974), Simmons (1975), 
Drewry and Jons (1975), and others. Even as recently as 2015, the Naval Sea 
Systems Command’s (NAVSEA’s) Program Executive Office, Ships (PEO-SHIPS) 
put out a presentation on Flexible Ships, detailing its “Affordable Relevance over the 
Ship’s Life Cycle” (Sturtevant, 2015). In it, the director of science and technology, 
Glen Sturtevant, noted that the main current and future challenges confronting the 
Surface Navy include facing unknown but evolving global threats while managing an 
accelerated pace of technological changes, coupled with handling rising costs and 
declining budgets. The analysis found that ships currently cost too much to build and 
sustain; the ships (Platforms) are too tightly coupled with their capabilities 
(Payloads); and inflexible and fixed architectures of legacy ships limit growth and 
capability upgrades or result in lengthy and costly upgrades. The effects of these 
issues, of course, are compounded by ever-evolving, unknown global threats. 
When the Freedom and Independence classes of American littoral combat 
ships (LCSs) were planned in late 1990s, designers focused on swappable rapid 
reconfiguration of combat capabilities through interchangeable mission modules. 
Anti-submarine and surface warfare mission modules could be interchanged within 
hours in the presence of an evolving threat. Beyond the LCS’s standard littoral 
combat and protection missions, these “plug-and-fight” mission modules provide 
significant combat flexibility within a single hull and cost savings in terms of having to 
maintain a smaller number of ships. In contrast to the traditional shipbuilding 
approach of cramming a wide-ranging set of bolted-in equipment into fixed 
installations, flexible ships can radically change the ships’ capabilities, by swapping 
in a full breadth of equipment focused on a particular need (Berkok, Penney, & 
Kivinen, 2013). 
Some examples of MAS and FASO that had been espoused in Navy research 
literature, such as in Sturtevant (2015); Doerry (2012); Koenig (2009); Koenig, 
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Czapiewski, and Hootman (2008); and others, include decoupling of payloads from 
platforms, standardizing platform-to-payload interfaces, rapid reconfiguration, 
preplanned access routes, and sufficient service life allowance for growth. These 
FASO approaches can be applied to a whole host of systems such as weapons, 
sensors, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, combat systems, C4I, flexible infrastructure, 
flexible mission bays and mission decks, vertical launch systems (VLSs) for various 
multiple missile types, future high-powered surface weapons (laser weapon systems 
and electromagnetic railguns), and modular payloads (e.g., anti-submarine warfare, 
special operations, mine warfare, intelligence gathering, close-in weapon systems, 
harpoon launchers, rigid hull inflatable boats, and gun systems).  
The concepts of adaptability and flexibility (plug-and-play concepts of rapidly 
removing and replacing mission systems and equipment pier-side or at sea), 
modularity (common design interface and modular components that will greatly 
simplify adding, adapting, modifying, or modernizing a ship’s capabilities), and 
commonality/scalability (capabilities that are built independently of a ship type by 
using standardized design specifications that allow similar systems to be placed 
across multiple ship platforms) are all concepts that can be evaluated using strategic 
Real Options Valuation (ROV) analytical methodologies. ROV has been used in a 
variety of settings in industry including pharmaceutical drug development, oil and 
gas exploration and production, manufacturing, start-up valuation, venture capital 
investment, information technology infrastructure, research and development, 
mergers and acquisitions, intangible asset valuation, and others. The current project 
applies the same design flexibility models utilizing ROV methods to identify the 
optimal ship design alternatives. 
Summers (1997) recognized the value of deferring decisions to the future. 
However, demonstrating this benefit analytically has been challenging. Gregor 
(2003) observed,  
Current valuations in naval ship design tend to focus on valuing a point 
designed product. Although there have been efforts to more completely 
explore the design space for the optimal solution, the optimal solution 
is based on a fixed set of requirements and preferences. In addition, 
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optimization infers certainty. There is no way in the current system to 
value adding flexibility to the design, since under certainty, flexibility 
has no value. Flexibility instead, has value, in situations with high 
uncertainty. 
More recently, Real Options theory has been recommended for evaluating the 
value of MAS technologies. Real Options theory proposes to apply financial options 
and analysis techniques to nonfinancial applications. Ship acquisition programs are 
characteristic of projects that benefit from investment options. MAS technologies 
provide those options. Real Options theory projects the value of being able to make 
decisions in the future when improved information is available to make a better 
decision. Gregor (2003), Koenig (2009), and Page (2011) provide good insights into 
the benefits and limitations of applying Real Options theory to naval ship 
acquisitions. 
A. Flexible and Adaptable Ship Design 
Seventy percent of the world is covered by water. To ensure freedom of 
navigation, economic independence, and national sovereignty, countries must 
maintain a highly efficient and technologically advanced fleet. With shrinking defense 
budgets, the current trend is to build fewer warships but maintain the same 
operational tempo. To continually meet the demands of a larger operational fleet, 
these new smaller fleets must be built on flexible and adaptable platforms with 
decoupled payloads that allow the vessel to accomplish a multitude of mission sets. 
This type of modular design and build “offers an opportunity for a ship to affordably 
transform its mission systems over its service life to maintain military relevance” 
(Doerry, 2012). The design characteristics that allow these fleets to flourish are 
Modular Adaptable Ships (MAS) and Flexible and Adaptable Ship Options (FASO; 
Mun & Housel, 2016). MAS- and FASO-incorporated designs provide an economical 
platform for a seagoing navy to build highly effective warships capable of performing 
various missions in a multitude of environments.  
Flexible and adaptable ship designs are centered around a standard hull with 
modular mission payloads that offer a wide mission set, affordable scalability, 
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reduced operational downtime, increased availability of the ship, and a reduced total 
number of mission modules for the fleet (Thorsteinson, 2013). For navies with limited 
budgets, having a flexible and modular platform allows a vessel to perform at times 
like a frigate and at other times like a corvette (Paris, Brussels, & Fiorenza, 2013). 
These new multi-mission vessels are already operational in blue-water fleets around 
the world operated by countries including Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, 
Australia, and the United States.  
Modular build and design have been in use since the mid-20th century. 
During World War II, Henry Kaiser’s shipyards were able to produce Liberty ships in 
minimal time due in part to the heavy use of modular construction, and the Germans 
constructed their Type 21 submarines with modular build principles (Abbott, Levine, 
& Vasilakos, 2008). Starting in 1979, the German shipyard Blohm & Voss began 
building modular corvettes and frigates for third-world navies using a modular 
concept known as MEKO. The MEKO concept has continually evolved with time 
producing the more mature MEKO A-100, A-200, and now A-400. In 1986, the Royal 
Danish Navy (RDN) began implementation of a modular concept called STANFLEX 
for a new class of patrol craft (Abbott et al., 2008) known as the Flyvefisken (SF 300) 
class. The specific use of modular mission payload within the SF 300s directly 
translated into the future design and development of the RDN Absalon support ships 
and Iver Huitfeldt class frigates. The French and Italians have worked together to 
design a flexible multi-mission frigate known as the FREMM class, while the 
Australian Royal Navy has the modular Anzac class of frigates and Hobart class of 
air-warfare destroyers (AWDs).  
The U.S. Navy began to look at modular builds in 1975 with the Sea Systems 
Modification and Modernization by Modularity (SEAMOD) program (Abbott et al., 
2008). SEAMOD focused on decoupling “the development of the payload from the 
development of the platform” (Doerry, 2012). This uncoupling provided two major 
benefits: It allowed the payload to be developed in parallel with the platform versus 
in series, which permitted the most recent technological systems to be installed 
onboard at the time the ship was put to sea, and it permitted rapid removal, 
replacement, or installment of mission payloads, preventing extended maintenance 
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yard periods (Abbott et al., 2008; Doerry, 2012). SEAMOD evolved into the Modular 
Open Systems Approach (MOSA) and is characterized by “modular design, key 
interfaces, and the use of open standards for key interfaces where appropriate” 
(Abbott et al., 2008). These efforts led to the development of the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) and DDG 1000 for the U.S. Navy (Abbott et al., 2008).  
To achieve expected service life, flexible and adaptable ships must be built 
with payloads that decouple from the platform, be configured with standard 
interfaces for technical modules, have the ability to reconfigure rapidly, and have 
allowances for growth margin. Growth margins allow for future technologies to be 
rapidly implemented into the existing design, preventing the vessel from having to 
enter into an extended maintenance overhaul period. Growth margins work hand in 
hand with the parallel development of mature payloads, ensuring that the latest 
technology can be installed as it is developed because of the standard interfaces. 
Over the past 40 years, significant strides have been made by foreign navies 
with regard to ship designs that incorporated modularity, flexibility, and adaptability. 
The designs focused heavily on a standard hull with the same engines but offered a 
variety of modular payloads for specific mission sets. Ultimately, MAS- and FASO-
incorporated designs provide an economical platform for a seagoing navy to build 
powerful, multi-task warships. 
Wills (2016) correctly stated that modularity provides a cost-effective solution 
to complex problems. For instance, he cited an example of the line of Littoral 
Combat Ships (LCSs) where 
the need for economical solutions to the problem of fielding low-end 
capabilities such as patrol, mine warfare, and antisubmarine warfare in 
littoral areas has plagued the Navy since the end of World War II. The 
smaller warships that have traditionally performed these roles have 
been slow and lacking in either range or capability. Single mission 
small ships like the Avenger class MCM’s and the Cyclone class patrol 
ships have been less able to accommodate significant updates over 
their service lives. Assigning a high-end warship like the DDG 51 class 
to such missions is overkill in both cost and capability. The LCS, 
through its system of modular capabilities resident on a common hull 
offers an affordable solution to the problem of how to field multiple low-
end capabilities and rapidly and affordably update them over time. 
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Each LCS mission package is an assembly of sensors, weapons, 
associated equipment, and the sailors needed to operate them. The 
mission module list currently features surface warfare, antisubmarine 
warfare and mine warfare packages. An LCS can only support one 
module at a time. LCS represents a compromise in a common hull for 
all three missions in that it is larger than the MCM and PC units, but 
smaller than the Perry class frigates it replaces. Modularity decouples 
the acquisition pathways of the ship and the capability. Individual 
capabilities can be developed and fielded rapidly outside the more 
complex process required for a ship where all such systems are 
always integrated. This open architecture should lead to lower costs 
over the life of the ship. For example, if the ship does not have to 
accommodate conditions inherent with permanent installation aboard a 
naval vessel (i.e., carry its towed array sonar through heavy seas or a 
shifting electrical load, then perhaps that piece of equipment will have 
a longer life span, require less maintenance and be a more effective 
tool when needed by the warfighter. The Navy remains committed to 
the concept of modularity as it looks forward beyond present ship 
classes. The LCS will provide a vital first look at modularity integrated 
from the start in a combatant ship class. 
Depetro and Rhyan (2018) stated that 
decisions made in the early stages of ship design can have profound 
effects on the cost of the ship throughout its life. For example, poor 
compartment configuration or hull selection can result in hydrodynamic 
inefficiency and significantly increased energy consumption and fuel 
costs. Space limitations, inadequate or non-existent removal routes 
and other accessibility problems may result in expensive equipment 
overhaul and replacement procedures, invasive removal methods, 
longer maintenance availabilities and increased maintenance costs. 
This highlights the need for a better understanding of Life Cycle Cost 
(LCC) implications early in the ship design process and development 
of better tools to aid early stage design decision-making. 
Scheibach and Lamb (2005) indicated that by utilizing the modular multi-
mission and outfit zones approaches compared with the traditional way of building 
ships, the benefits could be as follows:  
 Reduction in build time from 20% to 40% 
 Reduction in Hull, Mechanical & Electrical (HM&E) cost from 4% to 7% 
 Even more cost saving from reduction in number of mission 
systems/weapons required to meet the planned scenarios 
 Reduction in life-cycle costs 
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 Reduction in maintenance costs 
Cost reduction may come in the form of increases in timely switches between 
capabilities that may also affect procurement, maintenance, and operating costs. For 
instance, mission modules stored at forward hubs or onboard, while increasing ship 
costs, may reduce the number of trips to the home port significantly. Moreover, since 
modularity severs the jointness of various capabilities onboard the platform, a given 
module can be upgraded relatively independently of others (Berkok et al., 2013).  
For many years, ships have been constructed in a modular fashion. That is, 
significant portions of the ships are built as modules, and the modules are then put 
together as a final assembly. But “modular capability focuses not on the overall 
construction of the ship but, rather, on the rapid plug-and-play installation of 
capabilities such as guns, missiles, unmanned vehicles, SONARs, special forces 
accommodations, etc.” (MacKenzie & Tuteja, 2006). In addition, according to the 
authors, there are three key modular design types within the naval ship context:  
 STANFLEX concept of the Royal Denmark Navy 
 MEKO concept of Blohm + Voss GmbH 
 Modular Platform Concept (MOPCO) of Abeking & Rasmussen (A&R) 
Of the three design types, MEKO is most popular internationally. MEKO 
vessels are employed by Australia, Turkey, Greece, Germany, South Africa, and 
other countries. It is interesting to note that although MEKO naval ships are modular 
in design, there is little evidence that modularity is actually being used in the 
operation of these vessels. The main benefits of modularity and flexible ships 
include the following: 
 Operational flexibility (i.e., the ability to reconfigure ship for various 
missions) 
 Increased availability of the ship (i.e., reduced operational downtime) 
 Reduced total number of mission modules for the fleet, resulting in cost 
savings 
MEKO platforms are designed specifically for the varied deployment of 
standardized modules (weapons, electronics and the ship’s technical equipment) 
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which, in addition, are connected with the power supply, the air-conditioning and 
ventilation system and the data network, for example, via standardized interfaces. All 
the components needed to run a specific system are accommodated in a single 
module (MacKenzie &Tuteja, 2006). 
B. Royal Danish Navy 
The Royal Danish Navy (RDN) has been at the forefront of modular ship 
design since 1987 when the first of 14 Flyvefisken class or STANFLEX 300 (SF 300) 
multi-role vessels (MRVs) were commissioned. The design was based on a standard 
hull that used modular bays to change mission type through use of the Standard 
Flex (STANFLEX) concept. The Flyvefisken class was ultimately decommissioned in 
October 2010 (“Flyvefisken Class (SF 300), Denmark,” n.d.), but the use of the 
STANFLEX concept played a fundamental role in the design and development of the 
larger follow-on modular designs seen in the Absalon class littoral support ships and 
Iver Huitfeldt class frigates.  
Flyvefisken Class (SF 300) 
The inception of the Flyvefisken class and Standard Flex resulted from a 
feasibility study in 1982. The Royal Danish Navy wanted to replace its fleet of 24 
mission-specific ships (eight Fast Attack Craft [FAC], eight patrol boats, and eight 
mine countermeasure vessels) with a smaller number of multi-role vessels (MRVs; 
Pike, 2011). The RDN downsized to 14 MRVs and commissioned the SF 300 fleet 
between1987 and1996. To meet the multi-role vessel mission, the SF 300 was built 
on a standard hull of nonmagnetic fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP) that measured 
54m in length and 9m in beam, the crew varied between 19 and 29 personnel 
depending on mission type, and the overall tonnage ranged from 320–485 tons 
specific to payload installed (Pike, 2011).  
STANFLEX design capitalized on mission modularity by incorporating four 
interchangeable mission containers, one forward and three aft. The stainless-steel 
containers measured 3m by 3.5m by 2.5m and housed all dedicated machinery and 
electronic payloads connected by a standard interface panel (“Flyvefisken Class (SF 
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300), Denmark,” n.d.). “Each of these units can be (re)configured at a short notice 
for different roles, simply by installing the right combination of standard-size 
equipment containers in the four positions” (Pike, 2011). The ability to quickly and 
efficiently swap payload allowed these MRVs to serve the following mission sets: 
anti-air defense (AAW); anti-surface warfare (ASuW); anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW); electronic warfare (EW); mine countermeasures (MCM); patrol and 
surveillance; and pollution control (Pike, 2011).  
The use of containerized weapon systems permitted the SF 300 to have an 
open architecture C4I system that allowed “new weapons systems to be added by 
creating new nodes” (“Flyvefisken Class (SF 300), Denmark,” n.d.). Major 
technological upgrades were not required for the ship itself, but merely applied to the 
appropriate container. Containers could be swapped out in 30–60 minutes pier-side 
using standard civilian cranes, facilitating rapid mission change if necessary (Pike, 
2011). Ultimately, 15 different mission modules were developed for the SF 300, 
which included weaponized containers for the MK48 NATO vertical launch Sea 
Sparrow surface-to-air missile, Boeing’s Harpoon Block II surface-to-surface missile, 
and the 76mm Oto Melara Super Rapid gun (“Flyvefisken Class (SF 300), 
Denmark,” n.d.).  
The Flyvefisken class demonstrated that a smaller number of multi-role 
vessels were capable of meeting the same mission demands of a fleet almost twice 
its size. STANFLEX and modular payload allowed for containers to be pre-staged for 
mission flex while simultaneously reducing downtime for upgrades. The success of 
the SF 300 fleet was the cornerstone for the RDN’s development of the Absalon 
Littoral Combat Ship.  
Absalon Class Support Ships 
The success of STANFLEX propelled the Royal Danish Navy to continue to 
design seagoing naval vessels with modularity as the core requirement. The 
Flyvefisken class was a coastal platform capable of performing a mission set 
designed to protect local waters, but it lacked the endurance to deploy to the Gulf of 
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Aden or the Persian Gulf. The Flyvefisken class served the RDN from the mid-1980s 
through the early 2000s but left the Danish lacking a true blue-water navy. With a 
firm commitment to NATO’s Ocean Shield mission to combat piracy off the Horn of 
Africa, a need arose for a bigger platform capable of reaching distant locations like 
Somalia (Lundquist, 2012). 
To meet the rising need for a blue-water navy, the RDN commissioned two 
flexible support ships, HDMS Absalon in 2004 and HDMS Exbern Snare in 2005. 
Capitalizing on the success of the STANFLEX design and the use of payload 
modularity, the Absalons were designed with the same containerized weapon 
packages as the SF 300 but also featured “significant internal volume inside the 
multipurpose flexible support deck (FSD) to support stern ramps for vehicles and 
boats” (Lundquist, 2012). The ability to launch and recover small boats or vehicles in 
conjunction with containerized weapon systems allowed the Absalon to float 
between two classes of warship: amphibious and combatant (Lundquist, 2012). 
Under the various configurations, the Absalon class could be “equipped for naval 
warfare, land attack, strategic sealift missions, emergency disaster relief or as a 
hospital ship” (“Absalon,” n.d.).  
The Absalon class was built on a frigate hull and measures a little more than 
two-and-a-half times the length of the Flyvefisken class at 137m with a beam of 
19.5m (“Absalon,” n.d.). Total tonnage is between 4,500 tons and 6,300 tons, 
depending on configuration (Pike, 2016). “The ship design, with 16 watertight 
sections or compartments and two airtight bulkheads, incorporates survivability and 
damage limitation including dual redundancy, automated damage control zones, 
damage detectors and smoke zones” (“Absalon,” n.d.). Focusing on long-term cost 
savings based on crew requirements, the Absalon class was outfitted with a 
maximum crew of 100, could accommodate 70 additional personnel, could house 
another 130 in temporary container facilities on the flexible support deck, and has 
personnel facilities and a galley for up to 300 embarked crew (“Absalon,” n.d.; Pike, 
2016).  
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The Absalon class features five STANFELX container wells located 
amidships on the weapons deck (Lundquist, 2012; Pike, 2016). As with the SF 300, 
changing the combination of STANFLEX payloads allowed the Absalon class to 
easily shift mission. Each of the five individual containers is capable of being loaded 
with either eight Boeing Harpoon Block II surface-to-surface missiles or 12 surface-
to-air RIM-162 Raytheon Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSMs) (“Absalon,” n.d.; 
Pike, 2016). Additionally, the Absalon container wells were configured to handle “any 
combination of STANFLEX weapon/container suites developed for the Flyvefisken 
class” (Pike, 2016). By reusing existing containers and ensuring compatibility, the 
Absalon class created greater flexibility for mission type while proving to be cost-
saving. 
The modularity of the payload in conjunction with the flexible deck have 
allowed the Absalon class to be at the forefront of flexible and adaptable warship 
design. The flexible support deck is 90m long, with 250m of parking lanes, and 
encompasses 915m2 of total usable space (“Absalon,” n.d.). The FSD is designed 
for roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vehicles, and the reinforced deck “can embark vehicles 
up to 62t such as the Leopard II Main Battle Tank” (“Absalon,” n.d.). The flexible 
multipurpose deck can take  
75% of an Army reconnaissance battalion, a containerized hospital 
with 40 beds and a capacity for 10 surgeries a day, a containerized 
command module for a staff of up to 70 personnel, a container 
accommodation for emergency evacuations, up to 300 mines in 
modular rails … or facilities for carrying two high-speed insertion craft 
Swedish Type SRC-90E at 7.4t each. (Pike, 2016)  
The ability of the FSD to rapidly reconfigure missions based on the use of containers 
has allowed the Absalon class to effectively and efficiently meet all of its desired 
mission types.  
Modularity with the Absalon class is not limited to containerized weapons and 
the flexible support decks. The Combat Information Center (CIC) has a Terma C-
Flex combat management system and “virtually any console in CIC can be used 
interchangeably with the exception of the gun-firing console and Harpoon Block II 
consoles” (Lundquist, 2012). Finally, the flight deck is equipped with a hangar for two 
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helicopters, rated at 20t, and, when not in use for helicopter operation, it can store 
and stack cargo containers (Lundquist, 2012). The Absalon class demonstrated that 
modularity could be applied to larger combatant ships and was not localized to 
smaller littoral ships. Continuing to capitalize on the growing success of its modular 
techniques, the RDN moved forward with designing and building a flexible and 
adaptable frigate fleet. 
Iver Huitfeldt Frigates 
The success of the Absalon class laid the keel for the Iver Huitfeldt class 
frigates comprising three operational frigates: Iver Huitfeldt (F361), Peter Willemoes 
(F362), and Niels Juel (F363). The complement of the Absalon and Huitfeldt class 
added a true combatant element to an already formidable class of flexible support 
ships, providing the opportunity for the Royal Danish Navy to assume a more global 
blue-navy posture with extended deployments farther from native waters (Lundquist, 
2013).  
The Huitfeldt class was designed and built on the same hull used for the 
Absalon class, creating an 80% shared commonality between the two classes 
(Lundquist, 2013). The Huitfeldt class is 138.7m in length with a beam of 19.75m, 
carries a crew of 101, and has accommodations for 165. Where the Huitfeldt class 
lacks the flexible-support deck found on the Absalon class, it has a more 
sophisticated AAW capability and quieter acoustic signature for ASW operations, 
and is twice as powerful (Lundquist, 2013).  
The Huitfeldt class was built without the flexible support deck to 
accommodate the addition of a vertical launch system (VLS). The MK41 32-cell VLS 
is capable of launching the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) and the SM-6, as well as the 
RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) (“Iver Huitfeldt Class, Denmark,”, 
n.d.). In addition to the VLS, the Huitfeldt class continued with the modular mission 
payload design. The Huitfeldt class has six slots for weaponized containers that can 
be loaded with additional ESSMs or Harpoon Block II missiles (Lundquist, 2013). 
The frigates capitalized on the reuse of design elements, and the stainless-steel 
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containers used on the Huitfeldt are the same containers used on Absalon-updated 
and modified containers from the Cold War–era Flyvefisken class. When a container 
is not being utilized, it can be stored, updated, or re-equipped. Using a standardized 
interface, the weaponized containers represent flexibility and adaptability through 
their ability to plug and play on any Danish ship (Lundquist, 2013).  
The Combat Information Center (CIC) modeled the flexible support ships CIC 
and utilizes the same Terma C-Flex combat management system (CMS; Lundquist, 
2013). “Modularity and the COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf)-based system with an 
open architecture-approach (OA) makes these ships easy to modify and less time 
consuming to upgrade” (Lundquist, 2013). Upgrades to IT systems, weapons, 
communications, and sensors are done through rack replacement on the standard 
civilian 19-inch racks installed throughout the frigate (Lundquist, 2013). Through the 
use of IT modularity, the fleet of RDN frigates is capable of upgrading and installing 
technology faster and more efficiently. 
The Iver Huitfeldt class of frigates represents maturity in Danish modular ship 
design. Powerful and sophisticated, the frigate was built for $325 million (Cavas, 
2014), about one-third of the cost of a U.S. Arleigh Burke Flight III class destroyer 
(GAO, 2016). Cmdr. Senior Grade Per Hesselberg, who is in charge of the Danish 
frigate program, stated, 
We have built in flexibility from the beginning. It’s not that much more 
expensive in the beginning, but easier to update later on. It’s the safe, 
low-risk option. We learned from our flexible support ships to have 
extra space for containers on the frigates. Modularity makes ships 
easier and more economical to build. It also makes them more efficient 
to operate, less expensive to maintain and to modernize. (Lundquist, 
2013) 
For the last 30 years, the Royal Danish Navy has significantly reduced the 
size of its fleet and replaced it with a smaller, powerful, cost-effective fleet. The RDN 
has proven that flexible and adaptable ships with modular payloads can accomplish 
a multitude of missions and can play a significant role in international waters.  
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C. German Navy  
At the forefront of modular design for the German Navy is Blohm + Voss. The 
design concept known as Mehrzweck-Kombination (MEKO), which translates as 
“multi-purpose combination,” has been utilized in ship construction and design since 
the 1970s. The success of the MEKO class can be seen in 13 navies worldwide in 
various corvettes and frigates (Kamerman, 2015). The modular mission payloads in 
20-foot standardized ISO containers create adaptability and flexibility and allow 
navies to rapidly reconfigure mission type based on operational needs. Modules can 
be rotated for upgrades and maintenance or passed between ships, which reduces 
the number of overall payloads required for the fleet. This simple reduction results in 
significant cost savings in procurement and maintenance over the life cycle of the 
ship (“ThyssenKrupp,” n.d.). The MEKO class comprises the MEKO A-100 Corvette 
and the MEKO A-200 Frigate (“ThyssenKrupp,” n.d.), and is the backbone for the 
new German frigate class, the Baden-Württemberg (F125). 
The German Navy will acquire four Baden-Württemberg class frigates to 
replace the eight frigates in the Bremen class (F122) commissioned in the 1980s. 
The Baden-Württemberg frigate design incorporates enhanced survivability 
capabilities to include floating, moving, and fighting after sustaining damage; to 
embark and deploy special forces; and to maintain prolonged periods at sea with 
little maintenance; and it incorporates modular mission capabilities (Kamerman, 
2015). The F125 is a new hull design drawing from the MEKO A-200 and the 
German F124. It measures 149.5m in length with a beam of 18.8m, displaces 7,300 
tons at full load, and will carry a crew of 105–120, but can accommodate up to 190 
personnel to include a 20-person aircraft detachment and 50 embarked forces 
(“Baden-Württemberg,” 2017). The first frigate, Baden-Württemberg (F222), was 
commissioned in 2017, Nordrhein-Westfalen (F223) in 2018, Sachsen-Anhalt (F224) 
in 2019, and Rheinland-Pfalz (F225) in 2020 (Pape, 2016). 
The F125 class is designed to experience prolonged deployment periods of 
24 months and increased hours of operation of 5,000h/yr. This extended availability 
will be accomplished through a two-crew concept with crews swapping every four 
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months in the given operational theater (Kamerman, 2015). Through modernization, 
automation, and cross-rate training, the crew of the F125 is approximately half the 
size of the marginally smaller German Sachsen (F124) class frigates that currently 
deploy for six-month cycles and operate 2,500h/yr. The design flexibility of the F125 
will double the availability of the current German frigate fleet (Kamerman, 2015) 
while simultaneously reducing overhead. 
The F125 will take advantage of MEKO technology. MEKO designs rely 
heavily on modularity that increases the speed at which the ship can be built and 
facilitates faster upgrades and refits. The F125 will feature weapon modules, 
electronic modules, mast modules, and a modular combat system with standard 
interfaces (Kamerman, 2015). Given the flexibility in the design, the F125 readily 
translates into an exportable frigate design within the MEKO family: the MEKO A-
400 Generic Evolved MOTs Multi-Role Frigate. The MEKO A-400 will be built on the 
same class-standard hull with the same machinery as the F125 frigate but offers 
foreign navies the flexibility to specify any combination of combat systems from any 
supplier, resulting in more than 80% commonality between the two classes of ships 
(Kamerman, 2015). This commonality creates a larger fleet of ships from which to 
draw resources, technical knowledge, and maintenance upgrades.  
D. French Navy  
Similar to the Royal Danish Navy, the French Navy has made substantial 
strides over the last decade to replace three separate aging fleets with two smaller, 
state-of-the-art, flexible and adaptable fleets of frigates. The Frégate Européenne 
Multi-Mission (FREMM) was a joint venture between the Italian and French navies, 
built and designed by the Direction des Constructions Navales Services (DCNS, a 
French naval defense company) and Orizzonte Sistemi Navali with Fincatieri and 
Finmeccanica (“FREMM,” n.d.). These highly modular frigate designs allowed the 
French, Italians, and potential international clients a choice of equipment with 
regards to weapons and combat systems (Cavas & Tran, 2016). The newer Frégate 
de Taille Intermédiaire (FTI), specific to the French Navy, was unveiled in October 
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2016 (Peruzzi, Scott, & Pape, 2016). Designed by DCNS, it promotes modular 
design with potential international appeal (Cavas & Tran, 2016). 
Aquitaine Class 
The Aquitaine class FREMM frigates designed for the French will replace nine 
D’Estienne d’Orves class avisos (A69 Type Aviso) and nine Tourville and Georges 
Legues class anti-submarine frigates. The modular design of the FREMM vessels 
allowed the French Navy to choose between two mission versions: a land attack 
version with torpedoes, vertical launch system, and cruise missiles, or an anti-
submarine version fitted with torpedoes, vertical launch system, and an active towed 
array sonar (“FREMM,” n.d.). The French government originally committed to 17 
FREMMs, but defense budget cuts reduced the class to 11 and then ultimately eight 
vessels. The French Navy has committed to building two FREMMs in the land attack 
configuration and six in the anti-submarine configuration. Aquitaine (D 650) was 
commissioned in November 2012, Provence (D 652) was commissioned in June 
2015, and Languedoc (D 653) was commissioned in March 2016, each configured to 
anti-submarine warfare (Tomkins, 2016).  
The French FREMM is 142m in length, has a beam of 20m, displaces 6,000 
tons, and carries a crew of 108 (“FREMM,” n.d.). “The frigate’s layout has been 
designed to provide sufficient size for operational effectiveness, maintainability and 
sustained upgrades. The layout incorporates increased headroom between decks, 
deeper and longer engine compartments and larger equipment pathways for access 
and maintenance” (“FREMM,” n.d.). 
Both the land attack and anti-submarine versions of the Aquitaine class 
feature the MBDA Exocet MM40 Block III for anti-ship and littoral attack capability 
and the MBDA Aster 15 and Aster 30 for air defense. The land attack vessels will 
also be equipped with MDBA SCALP naval cruise missiles. Additionally, both 
versions of the frigate boast an aft helicopter hangar and deck encompassing 
520m2, while the land attack frigates “are fitted for a tactical unmanned air vehicle 
and have the capability to control long-endurance, medium and high-altitude 
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unmanned air vehicles launched from ground sites or from other platforms” 
(“FREMM,” n.d.). 
Similar to the Danish Absalon and Iver Huitfeldt classes, the Aquitaine class 
Combat Information Center (CIC) features a high-speed data network with an open 
architecture that will enable future weapon systems to be integrated into the frigates 
(“FREMM,” n.d.) With external communication equipment compliant with NATO 
standards, French FREMMs can operate on Link 11, Link 16, Link 22, and JSAT 
tactical data link (“FREMM,” n.d.). This international NATO co-operability has 
resulted in the Aquitaine and Provence participating in joint exercises with the U.S. 
Navy’s Task Force 50 in the Persian-Arabian Gulf (Tomkins, 2016).  
The design features of the FREMM have considered a flexible and adaptable 
modular build that allows for future growth in technology at a sustainable cost. Given 
choices between the various mission sets, growth margins for upgrades, and a 
relatively small and manageable crew size, FREMM is a viable option for a multitude 
of foreign navies.  
(1) Italian Bergamini Class 
Under the joint FREMM venture with the French, the Italian Navy has 
committed to the purchase of 10 frigates to replace the Lupo- and Maestrale-class 
frigates built in the 1970s by Fincantieri (“Italian Navy,” 2016). Known as the 
Bergamini class, Carlo Bergamini and Virginio Fasan were delivered in 2013, Carlo 
Margottini in 2014, Carabinieri in 2015, and Alpino in September 2016 (“Italian 
Navy,” 2016). The Italian Navy expects to have all 10 frigates delivered by 2020 and 
will operate four anti-submarine variants and six general-purpose variants of the 
FREMM class (“Italian Navy,” 2016).  
(2) Foreign FREMM Sales 
Given the modular choices for combat systems and weapons, smaller crew, 
and the capability to carry out various mission types, the FREMM class is appealing 
to foreign navies. Both the Egyptian Navy and Royal Moroccan Navy each operate a 
FREMM ship in anti-submarine configuration but without a vertical launch system or 
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jamming capabilities (Tomkins, 2016). Built by DCNS, FREMM Mohammed VI was 
delivered to Morocco in 2014, while FREMM Tahya Misr was delivered to the 
Egyptian Navy in 2015 (“Italian Navy,” 2016). 
FTI Class 
The success of the FREMM class has pushed the French to continue to tailor 
their existing fleet into a smaller, more highly effective combatant force. The Frégate 
de Taille Intermédiaire (FTI) is a medium-sized frigate and will replace the five in-
service La Fayette class frigates starting in 2023 (Peruzzi et al., 2016). “The 4,200-
ton frigate is a fresh design, different from the preceding FREMM multi-mission 
frigates, and features an unusual ‘inverted bow’ intended to improve seakeeping in 
high sea states” (Cavas & Tran, 2016). The FTI will be a formidable platform capable 
of executing the following: 
anti-submarine, anti-surface, and anti-air warfare capabilities, the 
ability to deploy special forces projections, capable of supporting 
operations against asymmetric threats, able to operate as a single 
vessel or as part of a joint national or combined international task 
force, provide power projection at distance, conduct maritime 
interdiction, crisis prevention, and intelligence gathering operations. 
(Peruzzi et al., 2016) 
The FTI will measure 122.25m in length, have a beam of 17.7m, and carry a 
crew of 125 personnel, including a 15-person aviation detachment, and can 
accommodate an additional 50 personnel depending on the mission. Each frigate 
will be equipped with two MBDA Aster 30 launchers, each consisting of four cells as 
compared to the four launchers on the FREMM class. FTI will be capable of 
launching the Aster MM-40 Exocet Block III guided anti-ship missiles and has a 
76mm cannon. Finally, the compact frigate will reach speeds of 27 knots with an 
endurance of 5,000NM on a combined diesel and diesel (CODAD) engine 
arrangement (Cavas & Tran, 2016). The complement of the eight FREMM vessels 
(six anti-submarine configurations and two air defense configuration), five FTIs, and 
two Horizon class anti-air warfare frigates will make the French Navy a 15-strong 
frigate force by 2030 (Cavas & Tran, 2016).  
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The FTI is estimated to cost $840 million, which is still 20–30% less than the 
6,000-ton FREMM (Cavas & Tran, 2016). Despite this price tag, DCNS is committed 
to producing a flexible and adaptable frigate that delivers options to the buyer, be it 
the French Navy or the international naval community, and estimates it could 
possibly sell an additional 40 frigates of this design (Cavas & Tran, 2016). At the 
core of the FTI design are embedded evolutionary and adaptive capabilities based 
around a modular design (Peruzzi et al., 2016) that offers freedom in a rapidly 
changing technical world for clients to pick and choose their combat systems and 
equipment (Cavas & Tran, 2016). 
E. Royal Australian Navy  
Currently, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) utilizes the Anzac class of frigates 
as its primary anti-submarine warfare platform. Built by Tenix Defense Systems (now 
part of BAE Systems Australia), eight were commissioned for the RAN between1996 
and 2006, and two were commissioned for the Royal New Zealand Navy in 1997 
and 1999 (“Anzac,” n.d.). “Anzac frigates are long-range escorts with roles that 
include air defense, anti-submarine warfare and surveillance” (Kerr, n.d.). The Anzac 
class displaces 3,600 tons fully loaded, has a length of 118m with a beam of 14.8m, 
and carries a crew of 174 personnel. The design of the Anzac is “based on the 
Blohm + Voss MEKO 200 modular design which utilizes a basic hull and 
construction concept to provide flexibility in the choice of command and control, 
weapons, equipment and sensors” (“Anzac,” n.d.). Given the success of the Anzac 
frigates, the RAN is moving forward with a new class of frigates that will need to 
incorporate a flexible and adaptable design to meet the growing demand for an 
efficient, sophisticated, and technologically advanced warship. 
The new Future Frigate initiative launched by the Royal Australian Navy is 
known as the SEA5000 Program. Anticipating an increased military presence in the 
Asia-Pacific region from both non-state and state actors by 2035, the RAN will need 
a frigate capable of deterrence and power projection (Goldsmith, 2016). SEA5000 
“will oversee the acquisition of nine high-capability Future Frigates and these major 
surface combatants will be capable of Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-Surface Warfare 
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(ASuW), with a strong emphasis on Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)” (Goldsmith, 
2016).  
Future Frigate Mandatory Design Characteristics 
Given the anticipated threat in the region, the RAN has stated that five critical 
capability criteria should be incorporated into the Future Frigate design (Goldsmith, 
2016). These five characteristics are essential to the long-term success of a flexible 
and adaptable RAN warship. 
1. Low Crewing Requirement: Due to RAN personnel shortages, the Future 
Frigates must be capable of safely operating with crew of fewer than 174. 
2. RAN Combat Capability Preferences: The Future Frigates must be capable 
of supporting the CEAFAR S/L/X radar suite with the SAAB 9LV Combat System 
and Aegis Fire Control System (FCS). It is also inferred that the RAN will insist on 
the inclusion of the multipurpose MK41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) as the ship’s 
principal weapons battery. 
3. Flexibility: The Future Frigates must be capable of accepting mission-
specific modules, as well as providing full hangar and logistics support for two HM-
60R helicopters. 
4. Ship Survivability: The Future Frigates must be capable of operating in the 
projected higher-threat environment of future decades, even without access to 
“external support.” The Future Frigates must also be capable of remaining partially 
functional even after suffering battle damage, and particularly due to the higher-
threat operating environment of future decades. Ship survivability is a pivotal aspect 
of the Future Frigate design since the RAN major surface combatant fleet is 
numerically finite and thus cannot lose a single ship without severe repercussions for 
the RAN’s capacity to sustain ship deployments over protracted periods. 
5. Growth Margin: The Future Frigates must have sufficient surplus space, 
weight, electrical power, and industrial-grade cooling to accommodate new “game-
changing” technologies as they mature in the period through 2035. For instance, 
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high-energy directed energy weapons are anticipated to mature over this period and 
promise to revolutionize naval operations.  
(1) Low Crewing Requirement 
Due to manning shortages within the RAN, the Australian DoD has stated that 
the crew size must not exceed that of the current Anzac frigate: 174 personnel. 
Given that naval personnel account for about 50% of a ship’s operating and 
sustainment life-cycle costs, it would be advantageous for the RAN to cut long-term 
costs by building a flexible and adaptable ship that reduces costs through manpower 
(Goldsmith, 2016). 
(2) Growth Margins 
Given the rapid growth in technologically advanced weapons over the last two 
decades, the new Future Frigate must incorporate a design that allows for continued 
growth without major, costly overhauls. The Future Frigate design must have 
“sufficient growth margins to accept new technologies as they mature” (Goldsmith, 
2016). To accommodate this growth margin, the original design must have 
“significant surplus space, weight, power and cooling margins” (Goldsmith, 2016).  
Potential Designs 
Initial designs were submitted from eight different countries with a history of 
designing and building flexible and adaptable vessels including France, Germany, 
Britain, Spain, Denmark, The Netherlands, Italy, and Australia (Kerr, n.d.). 
Ultimately, Italy (Fincantieri), Spain (Navantia), and British Aerospace (BAE) were 
selected to “refine their designs and prepare their commercial proposals for the 
comparative evaluation process (CEP)” (Kerr, n.d.). Fincantieri has built four 
FREMM frigates for the Italian Navy, with another four in production and two left to 
build. The RAN variant of the Bergamini class would not require modification to the 
existing hull design, already has twin helicopter hangars, and would create a large 
support structure with a family of 19 vessels (Kerr, n.d.). Navantia designed the RAN 
Hobart class of Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD), and the Future Frigate design would 
be a modified F-100 Frigate (Goldsmith, 2016) that “would benefit from more than 75 
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percent of systems commonality with the AWDs and about 40 percent with the 
Anzac class” (Kerr, n.d.). BAE has designed the Type 26 Global Combat Ship for the 
British Royal Navy, and the RAN version of the global combat ship stands to benefit 
from the mature Type 26 design already in production (Kerr, n.d.). Final design 
selection for the Future Frigate will occur in 2018 (Goldsmith, 2016). 
The Royal Australian Navy is pushing the design boundaries of flexible and 
adaptable ships to meet the evolving needs of a global navy with a deep blue-water 
reach and shrinking defense budgets. With a clear and concise list of critical 
capability criteria, the RAN will ensure that the Future Frigate will be able to meet the 
defense needs of the Australian people. 
F. American Navy 
As the U.S. Navy began to phase out its fleet of 51 Oliver Hazard Perry class 
frigates, its leadership began to look for a high-tech platform that could be used as a 
replacement (Osborn, 2015). The end result was the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in 
two variants: the trimaran-hull Independence class and the mono-hull Freedom 
class. The concept of the LCS was a highly flexible and adaptable ship that would 
allow the U.S. Navy to operate in littoral areas with a focus on maritime security and 
anti-piracy (Stashwick, 2016). “The ships were designed to be high-speed (over 40 
knots) and highly maneuverable, with the ability to swap out modules to provide 
mission-specific capabilities like anti-submarine, anti-surface, and mine-clearing” 
(Stashwick 2016). Both variants of the LCS included a mission bay in the design to 
house elements of mission packages. Within the LCS class, “mission packages are 
composed of mission modules, aircraft, and crew detachments to support the 
mission modules and aircraft” (Doerry, 2012). 
LCS—Freedom 
Currently, 13 Freedom class littoral combat ships have been ordered, and 
four have been commissioned. USS Freedom (LCS 1) was commissioned in 
November 2008; USS Fort Worth (LCS 3), in September 2012; USS Milwaukee 
(LCS 5), in November 2015; and USS Detroit in October 2016 (“Freedom,” 2016).  
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The Freedom class is built on a steel monohull and is capable of 
incorporating three mission packages: anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface 
warfare (ASuW), and mine countermeasures (MCM). LCS 1 has an overall length of 
115.3m, and all subsequent Freedom class vessels are 118.3m to improve through-
water performance. The beam of LCS 1 is 17.5m, while the remaining class is 
17.6m; the bow of LCS 5 and all subsequent models were modified from LCS 1 and 
LCS 3. LCS 1 has a maximum tonnage of 3,360 tons and the remaining Freedom 
class vessels reach a maximum tonnage of 3,480 tons, and all variants carry a crew 
of 50 (“Freedom,” 2016). 
The flexible design “incorporates a large reconfigurable seaframe to allow 
rapidly interchangeable mission modules, a flight deck with integrated helicopter 
launch, recovery, and handling systems and the capability to launch and recover 
maritime vehicles (manned and unmanned) from the stern side” (“Freedom,” 2016). 
Modular payload on the LCS comprises three modular weapons stations that can 
accommodate either a gun (MK46 30 mm gun) or missile module (Lockheed Martin 
AGM 114L Longbow Hellfire; “Freedom,” 2016). 
The low total gross weight allows the LCS class to obtain speeds greater than 
40 knots. The design trade-off for speed was sustained battle damage capability. 
Where other surface combatants could withstand and potentially recover from 
sustained-high intensity conflict, the Freedom class would likely result in 
abandonment of the vessel in the same type of conflict (Stashwick, 2016).  
LCS—Independence 
The Independence class of littoral combat ships has commissioned four ships 
with another six in construction and four more ordered. USS Independence (LCS 2) 
was commissioned in January 2010; USS Coronado (LCS 4) in April 2010; USS 
Jackson (LCS 6) in December 2015; and USS Montgomery (LCS 8) in September 
2016. 
The Independence class was designed on an aluminum trimaran hull form 
based on a commercial ferry design used by the Norwegian company Fred Olsen 
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(“Independence,” 2016). As with the Freedom class, the Independence is capable of 
performing three mission packages: anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface 
warfare (ASuW), and mine countermeasures (MCM). The Independence class has 
an overall length of 128.5m (about 10 meters longer than Freedom), with a top 
speed of 50 knots (“Independence,” 2016). The beam of Independence is 31.6m 
(approximately twice of Freedom), which can accommodate the MH-5E heavy-lift 
helicopter (used primarily for mine countermeasures). Full load displacement is 
3,188 tons, and it carries a crew of 40 personnel (“Independence,” 2016). 
The flexible design incorporates a “reconfigurable seaframe to allow rapidly 
interchangeable mission modules” that include three modular weapon stations 
(“Independence,” 2016). “The two-gun modules are each built around a MK46 30mm 
gun” (“Independence,” 2016) and the missile module has been fielded with the 
Longbow Hellfire a millimeter wave RF, fire-and-forget, high explosive anti-tank 
missile. The Independence class features a side-ramp with roll on/roll off capability 
and can carry two 11m RHIBs (rigid hull inflatable boat) “available for use by 
boarding teams carrying small arms” (“Independence,” 2016). 
Small Surface Combatant 
The U.S. Navy originally intended to contract for 52 littoral combat ships, but 
in January 2014, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel “instructed the Navy that there 
would be no new contracts awarded for LCS production beyond 32 ships” (Osborn, 
2015). In place of the remaining 20 littoral combat ships, the Navy was to build a 
Small Surface Combatant ship. On January 15, 2015, Secretary of the Navy Mabus 
stated that a new class of ship was required to have frigate-like capabilities and thus 
would change the designation of the last 20 ships from LCS to FF (Osborn, 2015).  
The new frigate will capitalize on the two existing hull variants used in the 
Freedom and Independence classes (Eckstein, 2015). Speaking at an American 
Society for Naval Engineers event, CAPT Dan Brintzinghoffer stated that the new 
frigate would take the basic LCS design but differ in that it “will be more lethal, more 
survivable, and will be able to conduct surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare 
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simultaneously, whereas the LCS had to choose only one mission package to work 
with at any given time” (Eckstein, 2015). In addition, 
it will have a torpedo decoy, variable depth sonar and multi-function 
towed array permanently onboard, rather than included in a part-time 
mission package for LCS; will deploy two 7-meter rigid-hull inflatable 
boats rather than the 11-meter RHIBs on the LCS surface warfare 
package; and will retain the Mk 50 30mm guns rather than converting 
to the more common 25mm gun. The ship will be upgunned with a 
SeaRAM anti-ship missile system, a ship-launched Hellfire missile 
system and an over-the-horizon surface-to-surface missile system. 
(Eckstein, 2015) 
The new class of frigates will trade the high-speed capability of the LCS class 
in order to accommodate the additional weight created by the heavier armor for 
increased survivability (Eckstein, 2015). To make the new frigate class cost-efficient, 
CAPT Brintzinghoffer stated that commonality will be required across both variants, 
and it will likely need to share some modular aspects with the LCS class or some 
commonalities with other classes of surface combatants (Eckstein, 2015).  
This new class of frigates represents an opportunity for the U.S. Navy to build 
on an existing hull, capitalizing on cost savings in the early design process, and 
incorporate more advanced flexible and adaptable modules in the payload design. A 
proven example of a flexible and adaptable frigate with modular payload with similar 
tonnage is the MEKO A-200 class frigate. The MEKO class family is designed for 
sustained battle damage and could provide guidance for enhanced survivability 
options for this new class of American frigates.  
G. Real Options Valuation with Flexible Ships 
The U.S. Navy needs to develop a more sophisticated method for flexible and 
adaptable ship design if it is going to keep pace with a rapidly evolving worldwide 
naval threat. In the past, ship design relied on highly experienced naval architects 
who were well versed in a straightforward ship design that was fixed and rigid 
(Caprace & Rigo, 2010). This outdated method of ship design is becoming cost-
prohibitive when looking at the lifetime life-cycle cost for upgrades, and overhauls, 
and drives inflexibility for mission change (Koenig et al., 2008). Due to the rigidity in 
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the build and failure to build with margin, U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers are 
failing to meet their designed service lives by almost 10 years (Doerry, 2012).  
While ship design needs to incorporate flexibility and adaptability, the possible 
set of requirements for the design is so great that it is prohibitively expensive to 
attempt to design a ship including every desired feature. Instead, the ship design 
needs to incorporate options that can be deferred to the future when the exact 
requirements are better understood:  
The key to modular adaptable design is incorporating options in the 
design to be able to defer the exact configuration of the ship to that 
point in time when the requirements are known, and to have the 
capability to affordably modify the ship’s configuration to meet the 
requirements when they become known. (Doerry, 2012)  
Moving forward with flexible and adaptable ship design requires sophistication 
and finesse. One valuable tool on the market to assist the U.S. Navy with evaluating 
the inherent risk in adaptable and flexible ship design is Real Options Valuation 
(ROV). ROV is a systematic approach and integrated solution that uses various 
inputs including modeling, statistics, and economic analysis to provide decision-
makers with a varied set of design options from which to choose. ROV is a powerful 
tool in this situation because traditional return on investment (ROI) design 
comparison trade-offs cannot defensibly be applied to these assets (Mun & Housel, 
2016). 
By computing the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) of the ship design, a 
common unit of output (CUO) value will be developed that will allow decision-makers 
to assess the actual cost and value of people, systems, or processes within the 
design. KVA ultimately delivers two metrics—Return on Knowledge (ROK) and 
Return on Knowledge Investment (ROKI)—that can be used to generate input 
values for real options analysis (Mun & Housel, 2016). Finally, integrated Risk 
Management (IRM) builds on the portfolio of options available in the design process 
by using a quantitative software suite to provide objective quantification of risk, 
flexibility, strategy, and decision analysis (Mun & Housel, 2016). 
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Real Options Valuation allows shipbuilders to design for uncertainty. “In the 
design state, options analysis enables more realistic assessments of technologies 
and design features that add flexibility during development and adaptability during 
the post-commissioning life cycle” (Koenig, 2009). ROV creates five standard 
investment options: option to expand, option to contract, option to wait or defer an 
investment, option to choose between different assets, and option to vary the mix 
(Koenig, 2009). Real Options is a quantitative approach to ascertaining the amount 
of risk in a modular build when the risk is unknown. Using simulation, a portfolio of 
options can be presented to the design team, allowing for a more flexible build that 
has margin for growth or mission change. The portfolio of options created using Real 
Options analysis can be value- and cost-driven or payload-specific, forcing the 
design to accept some risk in the final product (Mun & Housel, 2016). 
By incorporating the theories of Real Options Valuation (ROV), Knowledge 
Value Added (KVA), and Integrated Risk Management (IRM) into existing design 
builds, the U.S. Navy can use the DDG 51 Flight III Series to model a business case 
for making strategic decisions under uncertainty (Mun & Housel, 2016).  
Using Monte Carlo simulation, thousands of simulations can be run to 
determine possible outcomes for flexible and adaptable ship design. Ultimately, 
ROV, KVA, and IRM can provide naval architects, senior leadership, and decision-
makers the opportunity to exercise the strategic ability to either move forward with a 
portion of the ship design or abandon it because the initial risks have become known 
over time (Mun & Housel, 2016). 
In a U.S. Navy research article, Page (2011) determined that when the design 
investment analysis was performed under the assumption of risk and uncertainty, 
the U.S. Navy could realize improved “matching of operational capability and 
decreased fiscal burden through the conscious design of flexible architectures.” The 
process explained was straightforward in terms of framing and analysis of the real 
options but difficult because it requires a change in thinking and mind-set for 
decision-makers. First, the U.S. Navy must “identify the sources of uncertainty in 
each platform design” (Page, 2011). This is an important fact, as strategic flexibility 
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or real options are always more valuable with uncertainty. In all cases in which the 
U.S. Navy “designs enough flexibility to realize cost benefits, the value of this 
flexibility increases with increases in variability of the inputs.” The converse is also 
true: If the future state is more certain, flexibility has less potential value. The U.S. 
Navy could benefit from application of this type of flexibility analysis to “platforms 
other than medium displacement surface combatants. Amphibious vessels provide 
an interesting platform for studying service life allowances and design margins.” To 
summarize, the U.S. Navy would realize “fiscal and operational benefits by 
incorporating options in its platforms starting in early stage design. The fact is, the 
Navy already executes options on its platforms and programs but does so without 
the recognition and analysis of the uncertainties” (Page, 2011). 
In the article, “Surviving a Perfect Storm,” Siegel (2005b) found that “the U.S. 
Navy’s shipbuilding program is charting a course through a perfect storm 
characterized by strategic change, developing doctrinal concepts, changing 
managerial approaches, uncertainty over its future force size and mix, and 
increasing fiscal pressure.” Thus, the Navy has explored “new deployment 
approaches like Sea Swap” (Siegel, 2005b) and other ways to get more out of its 
capital investments in ship construction. While these approaches had been identified 
earlier on as the only viable options to either increase funding levels or slash 
acquisition and reduce future capabilities, Siegel also stated that Sea Swap and 
other initiatives like it are not adequate. In his article, Siegel (2005b) suggested that 
there is a third option: “how to get $13 billion worth of shipbuilding effects for $10 
billion in funding.” Such an option would require changing the navigational rules of 
the road for what many refer to as a “broken acquisition process.” Siegel (2005b) 
offered the following suggestion to change the shipbuilding rules to help the Navy 
and the nation get more bang for the shipbuilding buck:  
Limit requirements growth and change orders. Requirements growth 
during development, driven by a dynamic security environment, is a 
key factor in increased ship cost. Locking in a flexible design with the 
ability to make scheduled block changes would provide an affordable 
baseline design that could be upgraded as increased funding becomes 
available and requirements evolve. 
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O’Rourke (2010) found that the U.S. Navy’s budget pressures are 
compounded by a “real decline in the DoD budget and policy-makers could face 
difficult choices to fund programs for some kinds of Navy capabilities but not others. 
If so, the resulting fleet could have gaps in capability as well as capacity.” It follows 
that the U.S. Navy can utilize strategic real options for addressing situations such as 
“finding more U.S. Navy cost-saving efficiencies, reducing the cost of U.S. Navy 
shipbuilding programs, and shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture” 
(O’Rourke, 2010). 
The Defense Industry Daily staff (2016) considered littoral combat ships 
(LCS) and found that they  
exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in 
electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the U.S. 
Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant 
fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex 
ships, the U.S. Navy’s $35+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was 
intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants 
that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, 
while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.  
It hasn’t always worked that way, though. In practice, the U.S. Navy  
hasn’t been able to reconcile what they wanted with the capabilities 
needed to perform primary naval missions, or with what could be 
delivered for the sums available. The LCS program has changed its 
fundamental acquisition plan four times since 2005, and canceled 
contracts with both competing teams during this period, without 
escaping any of its fundamental issues. Now, the program looks set to 
end early. (Defense Industry Daily, 2016) 
The Report to the Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction 
of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2016 stated that the shipbuilding plan for the U.S. 
Navy is to build and maintain a battle force inventory  
above 300 ships, and to ultimately achieve the shipbuilding plan 
objective of 308 battle force ships between FY2022 and FY2034. The 
rate of large surface combatant retirements beyond FY2034 exceeds 
the ability of the Navy to finance a build rate that sustains the 308-ship 
force structure until after completion of the OR SSBN program. Thus, 
Navy structure remains about 300 ships until the mid-2040 timeframe. 
(Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2015, p. 9)  
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The mix of ships, by quantity and type, contained in this report, possesses the  
requisite capability and capacity to carry out the DSG mission. They 
enable the COCOMs to meet mission demands to Maintain a Safe, 
Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent; Deter and Defeat Aggression; 
Project Power Despite Anti-access/Area Denial Challenges; Counter 
Terrorism and Irregular Warfare; Provide a Stabilizing Presence; 
Conduct Stability/Counterinsurgency Operations; and Operate 
Effectively in Cyberspace/Space. We achieve the desired mix of ships 
if this shipbuilding plan receives stable and sufficient funding over the 
long haul. (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2015, p. 9)  
In “Condition Sinking,” Wilson (2014) stated that the U.S. Navy faces a 
shipbuilding crisis in the 2020s as several whole classes of ships are 
ready for replacement all at once. Mismanagement and multibillion 
dollar cost overruns are becoming bigger enemies for the U.S. Navy 
than the Chinese military ever could. The U.S. Navy plans for a 306-
ship fleet are taking on water, awash in a sea of cost overruns and a 
huge block of older ships that should be replaced. Hard budgetary 
choices are needed, and the consequences to U.S. foreign policy 
could be serious. Also, coming in over budget and in smaller numbers 
is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program to replace an aging fleet of 
Oliver Hazard Perry frigates and mine warfare vessels. 
The LCS is designed as a high-speed multipurpose vessel for operations in 
the littorals (coastal waters) with reduced crews compared with the frigates they are 
replacing. The LCS has an open architecture capable of handling modules for 
different missions. Instead of selecting one contractor and one design, the Navy 
decided in 2009 to build some of each. This approach is a standard strategic real 
option as flexibility is created in its design (handling of multiple modules is an option 
to switch and change, fewer crew members is an option to contract, and extension 
into multiple missions is an option to wait and execute). 
Each time a major defense review is undertaken, policymakers must confront 
a range of complicated issues about the U.S. Navy’s  
future force structure, including resource concerns and significant 
changes in the shipbuilding industrial base. To help answer these 
concerns, analysts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and 
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) staff turn to the available 
analytical tools to help provide strategic options to decision-makers. 
Although an array of such tools exists, there is a significant need for 
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improvement to ensure that policy and resource decisions are well 
analyzed and supported. (Arena, Schank, & Abbott, 2004, p. xv) 
In earlier research, RAND identified the types of issues that arise during these 
defense reviews and evaluated the capacity of current analytical models to help 
address these issues. It was found that the most common concerns of defense 
analysts were  
cost, schedule, industrial base capacity, shipyard performance, and 
program management strategies. Further, existing tools lacked an 
integrated approach that would allow analysts to consider not just 
individual elements (e.g., manpower and procurement funding 
requirements) but the interaction and interrelationships among the 
industrial base components—from attrition rates to ship life extensions, 
from labor learning curves to overhead costs. We then outlined an 
overarching analytical architecture that could provide this integrated 
analysis environment—an environment in which the user is able to 
understand the implications of force structure choices on resource 
requirements and the private shipyard industrial base. (Arena et al., 
2004, p. xv) 
In “Institutionalizing Modular Adaptable Ship Technologies,” Doerry (2012) 
found that with an uncertain future,  
the U.S. Navy is tasked with fulfilling its missions in an environment of 
evolving threats and a corresponding rapidly evolving mission system 
technology base. Affordability of our fleet is also of paramount concern. 
An alternative to the traditional approach of optimizing a point ship 
design to meet a specific set of fixed requirements is needed to 
maintain a sufficiently sized and relevant naval fleet that can be built 
and supported within the available budget. Modular Adaptable Ship 
(MAS) technologies offer an opportunity for a ship to affordably 
transform its mission systems over its service life to maintain military 
relevance. 
While various MAS technologies have been available for years and, in many 
cases, have been “installed onboard ships in an ad hoc manner, a design 
methodology does not currently exist to establish a sound technical basis for 
determining how much of what type of modularity to install on a ship” (Doerry, 2012). 
Doerry also reviewed the status of several MAS technologies to include modular hull 
ships, mission bays, container stacks, weapon modules, aperture stations, off-board 
vehicles, Electronic Modular Enclosures (EME), and Flexible Infrastructures: 
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These technologies are evaluated against criteria for their readiness 
for integration into a ship design, and this paper also described and 
evaluated the current states of processes needed to successfully 
integrate MAS technologies on a ship. These processes include: cost 
estimation; valuing modularity and flexibility; acquisition, maintenance 
and modernization strategies; and optimizing ship configuration. 
(Doerry, 2012)  
Doerry’s paper introduced the use of Real Options theory as part of the solution for 
measuring value. 
In “The Fleet We Need: A Look at Alternative—and Affordable—Futures for 
the U.S. Navy,” Hoffman (2006) explored the nature of tomorrow’s U.S. Navy by 
examining and expanding on an “incredibly detailed Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) study authored by Eric Labs, who is recognized as one of the nation’s 
premier naval analysts and an objective expert in costing naval programs. This 
extensive CBO study comes on the heels of a long debate on alternative fleet 
designs in 2005” (Hoffman, 2006). The main conclusion of the CBO analysis is that 
“unless shipbuilding budgets increase significantly or the U.S. Navy designs and 
builds much cheaper ships, the size of the fleet will fall substantially. The most 
critical implication to take from this detailed and balanced analysis is the conclusion 
that the Navy’s shipbuilding plan is based upon several optimistic assumptions that 
cast its validity into severe doubt” (Hoffman, 2006). He goes on to say, 
My own option is based on the teachings of Julian S. Corbett, the 
British strategist/historian who emphasized the use of a navy to serve 
joint operations ashore. Rather than supporting the Navy’s focus on 
future hypothetical threats, this option exploits our domination of the 
global commons to improve our capacity to execute sea denial in key 
choke points and penetrate ashore against real threats we face today.  
In the article, “Applying Real Options Analysis to Naval Ship Design,” Knight 
and Singer (2014) found that there is a  
trend in global navies toward highly flexible, modular architectures. 
This is driven, at least in part, by compressed acquisition cycles, faster 
technology refresh rates, and contracting budgets. Given the 
importance of flexibility in naval ship design, the methods used for 
evaluating naval assets should adequately capture the impact of such 
flexibility. Static budgetary techniques like net present value (NPV) 
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analysis are known to underestimate the value of the embedded 
“optionality” of flexible design features. The use of ROV has been 
proposed to correct this underestimation; however, ROV is not 
universally applicable to the naval domain because of some of its key 
assumptions, such as the existence of a market and cash flows. 
Expected utility methods alone are also inadequate as they ignore 
important considerations such as loss aversion.  
Historically, these constraints have left designers and decision-makers to rely on 
their intuition and engineering experience when evaluating flexible systems and 
architectures. This current study presents a novel quantitative framework for valuing 
flexible naval assets, called  
prospect theory-based real options valuation (PB-ROV), which merges 
concepts from real options theory, utility theory, prospect theory, and game 
theory. The framework makes it possible to apply the principles of ROA [i.e., 
return on assets] to Navy assets. (Knight & Singer, 2014) 
In Real Options for Naval Ship Design and Acquisition: A Method for Valuing 
Flexibility Under Uncertainty, Gregor (2003) stated that the U.S. Navy is facing a 
need for a novel surface combatant capability. This new system of ships must be  
designed to meet the uncertainty associated with constantly changing 
required mission capabilities, threats, and technological advances. 
Flexibility in design and management will enable these systems to 
maximize their performance under changing conditions. Real options 
involve the right but not the obligation to take a course of action. Real 
options embody the flexibility that allows projects to be continually 
reshaped, as uncertainty becomes resolved. (Gregor, 2003)  
Gregor’s thesis was intended to identify and analyze the real options available for 
the design and acquisition of naval ships, as well as to determine the value of these 
options and to determine the best types and amount of flexibility to design into naval 
systems to maximize the value of the system over time under uncertain conditions. 
In A Prospect Theory–Based Real Option Analogy for Evaluating Flexible 
Systems and Architectures, Knight (2014) described the constant trend in the U.S. 
Navy design and acquisition programs that emphasizes flexible systems and 
architectures. Modularity and design-for-upgradability are two examples of this trend.  
Given the increasing importance of flexibility in U.S. Navy design, the 
methods used for valuing naval assets should adequately capture the 
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impact of such flexibility. Current static budgetary techniques and net 
present value (NPV) analysis underestimate the value of the 
embedded optionality of flexible design features. The use of ROV has 
been proposed to correct this underestimation; however, the theory is 
not universally applicable to the naval domain because of key 
assumptions made by a real options approach. For instance, ROV 
assumes that assets generate cash flows, which have a measurable 
value based on their volatility and the prevailing market price of risk. 
Naval assets, however, do not generate cash flows, nor are they 
traded on a market. Furthermore, traditional ROV does not allow for 
the possibility of the option’s value being interdependent with the 
decisions of other agents in one’s environment. These deficiencies 
leave designers and decision-makers to rely on their intuition and 
engineering experience when evaluating flexible systems and 
architectures. A quantitative evaluation framework would add valuable 
analytical rigor to increasingly complex designs and demanding 
mission requirements. (Knight, 2014) 
In the article, Real Options in Ship and Force Structure Analysis, Koenig 
(2009) stated that in the  
evaluation of large, risky expenditures on long-lived capital 
investments, conventional engineering economic analysis methods do 
not provide adequate insight into the option value of managerial 
flexibility and strategic interactions. A common practical remedy is to 
set aside the (incomplete) analysis in favor of intuition and judgment, 
which in many instances results from tacit knowledge of embedded 
option-type value. If this value could be explicitly documented, then the 
decision criteria would be more transparent. A real options analogy 
with financial options has been proposed; the attraction is that methods 
for valuing financial options are mature. Naval ship design and 
acquisition is an option-laden environment. Therefore, if a naval 
version of the real options analogy were developed, it would add 
considerable insight.  
Neches and Madni (2013) delivered a manifesto on engineering resilient 
systems (ERS) and conveyed potential of technology-enabled innovations in 
processes, and tools for developing affordably adaptable and effective systems were 
presented. In addition, this paper sought to clarify the problem by characterizing it as 
a science and technology problem, rather than a process adherence or 
reengineering problem.  
During the long and somewhat turbulent history of the Zumwalt 
program, the U.S. Navy has continuously supported the ship while 
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expanding its capabilities and reducing its numbers. After years of 
justifying its requirements, the Navy has reversed direction and is 
arguing that its future multi-mission destroyer is no longer the answer 
to the threats the service may face in the future. (Eaglen, 2008) 
In “Small Combat Ships and the Future of the Navy,” Work (2004) stated that  
in November 2001, the U.S. Navy announced a new family of 21st 
century surface warships that includes a small, focused-mission 
combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The LCS would be a 
fast, stealthy warship designed specifically for operations in shallow 
coastal waters. It would have a modular mission payload, allowing it to 
take on three naval threats—diesel submarines, mines, and small 
“swarming” boats—but only one at a time. There are sound reasons 
why the LCS should be pursued. On the other hand, much about the 
ship’s concept of operations remains to be proven or explored. The 
present plan, modified to allow for thorough operational testing of the 
LCS concept and design, is the proper one. The U.S. Navy is pursuing 
a new, more distributed fleet architecture to fit its new vision of 
scalable battle networks. Envisioning the LCS as a component of a 
larger fleet battle network helps to explain the ship’s design goals as 
well as the missions it will initially perform. The new ship aims to be the 
Swiss army knife of future naval battle networks. Its design is being 
shaped by six principles: Get fast, get connected, get modular, get off-
board, get unmanned, get reconfigured.  
In Navy Ship Acquisition: Options for Lower-Cost Ship Designs—Issues for 
Congress, O’Rourke (2005) stated that  
aside from reducing planned ship procurement rates, one option would 
be to reduce U.S. Navy ship procurement costs by shifting from 
currently planned designs to designs with lower unit procurement 
costs. Lower-cost designs for attack submarines, aircraft carriers, 
larger surface combatants, and smaller surface combatants have been 
proposed in recent reports by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 
DOD’s Office of Force Transformation (OFT), and the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). Options for lower-cost 
designs can be generated by reducing ship size; shifting from nuclear 
to conventional propulsion; shifting from a hull built to military 
survivability standards to a hull built to commercial-ship survivability 
standards; or using a common hull design for multiple classes of ships. 
Additionally, lower-cost designs for attack submarines, aircraft carriers, 
larger surface combatants, and smaller surface combatants have been 
proposed in three recent reports discussing the future of the U.S. 
Navy.  
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O’Rourke (2005) also said that options for lower-cost U.S. Navy ship designs can be 
generated by  
starting with currently planned U.S. Navy ship designs and making one 
or more of the following changes: reducing ship size, shifting from 
nuclear to conventional propulsion, shifting from a hull built to military 
survivability standards to a hull built to commercial-ship survivability 
standards, and using a common hull design for multiple ship classes. A 
sixth option for responding to rising ship costs would be to improve the 
operating efficiency of yards building Navy ships by incorporating more 
advanced design and production processes and equipment.  
In a research report from Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, the author 
stated that “shipbuilding is facing a perfect storm and leadership is dedicated to 
charting and navigating a course through this storm. Real options exist to improve 
the nation’s, the U.S. Navy’s, and industry’s ability to navigate the storm” (Siegel, 
2005a). 
In Designing Adaptable Ships: Modularity and Flexibility in Future Ship 
Designs, the authors “attempt to answer what are the U.S. Navy’s options for 
extending the service lives of operational ships by adopting the concepts of 
modularity and flexibility in ship design” (Schank et al., 2016). The researchers 
examine the concepts of “modularity and flexibility, technological trends, the current 
geopolitical context, and lessons from past incorporation of new missions and 
technologies into naval ships” (Schank et al., 2016). 
According to a report by Frank Hoffman (2008), “Because of the U.S. Navy’s 
struggle to present an acceptable rationale for an affordable future fleet to meet the 
nation’s needs, the U.S. Congress requested several alternative fleet architectures 
from various agencies.” This report addressed several fleet design options and 
presented a “compromise option designed to be compatible with an Off-Shore 
Partnering strategy and to be more affordable over the long range.”  
In “A More Flexible Fleet,” Commander Jim Griffin (2015) stated that  
few people dream of owning a minivan. Rarely associated with 
performance or handling, they are known for efficiency, adaptability, 
and practicality. There is nothing sexy about minivans, but they 
became the vehicle of choice for millions because they provide the 
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best balance of capability, durability, and affordability. The Arleigh 
Burkes will remain the high-end, top-of-the-line multi-mission platforms, 
while the LCSs already programmed will be effective at lower-threat 
missions or operations in shallow littoral waters. A third type of vehicle 
is needed: one that is capable at a reasonable cost. Today the U.S. 
Navy is buying luxury sedans and sports cars. If we want to be able to 
meet the emerging threats of tomorrow within our likely budgets, we 
will need to replace some of our sports cars with minivans. 
In Flexible Ships: Affordable Relevance Over the Ship’s Life Cycle, the author 
found that there are several imperatives for change, including the following 
challenges: “Ships cost too much to build and sustain; payloads (capabilities) are 
strongly coupled to platforms (ships); legacy ship design margins limit growth for 
capability upgrades; inflexible architectures result in lengthy and costly upgrades to 
ships; ships need to stay relevant over their entire service life; and the future is 
uncertain and the pace of changing threats is increasing” (Sturtevant, 2015). In 
addition, the author finds that there are a few Flexible Ships Tenets, with the goal of 
the Flexible Ships Initiative to deliver  
affordable relevance to U.S. Navy ships over their entire life cycle. It 
consists of the following five attributes: (i) De-coupled Payloads 
(capabilities) from Platforms (ships). Traditionally, Navy ships have 
been tightly coupled to weapons and sensors and as such, require 
lengthy and costly ship overhauls to rip out and modernize their 
systems. The Flexible Ships concept treats weapons and sensors as 
modular payloads that can be easily replaced for ship mission 
adaptability and new capabilities. (ii) Standard Platform-to-Payload 
Interfaces––well-defined, common interfaces for distributed ship 
services that are prescribed and managed by the U.S. Navy. (iii) Rapid 
Reconfiguration–specific C5I compartments that can be easily re-
configured with upgraded equipment or new systems. (iv) Pre-planned 
Access Routes–used for the easy removal and replacement of interior 
equipment or systems. (v) Sufficient service life allowance growth 
margins: Space and weight for future capabilities, and provision for 
projected demand for distributed systems such as electric power, 
cooling and network bandwidth. (Sturtevant, 2015) 
Matthews (2015) also believes that new surface ship designs must be flexible 
and adaptable, stating that  
from 1961 to 2012, the Navy built 16 different types of ships. It seemed 
like every time they introduced a new sensor or weapon, they built a 
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new ship and if those were shipbuilding’s glory years, they’re over now. 
Ships cost so much to build now that they must be designed with 
enough flexibility to accommodate new equipment and new missions 
as technology and threats change. … And they’ve got to last. A 
destroyer should last 35 years. The U.S. Navy can no longer afford to 
retire ships early, as it did with Spruance-class destroyers. 
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IV. The Theories of Strategic Real Options, 
Knowledge Value Added, and Integrated Risk 
Management 
This review of the ROV-KVA-IRM approach is intended to provide a concise 
tutorial context for the specific use of these tools as they are applied to strategic ship 
design challenges. The examples of the use of ROV in for-profit organizations 
provide a background of the successful use of the approach in a competitive, 
market-driven environment. The review of the KVA approach is provided to 
demonstrate how this approach can be used to generate objective value estimates 
to feed the ROV estimates in the IRM eight-step framework. The IRM review is 
intended to demonstrate how the ROV and KVA approaches can be combined to 
generate value, risk, and optimal portfolio estimates. 
In the past, corporate investment decisions were cut and dried. Buy a new 
machine that is more efficient, make more products costing a certain amount, and if 
the benefits outweigh the costs, execute the investment. Hire a larger pool of sales 
associates, expand the current geographical area, and if the marginal increase in 
forecast sales revenues exceeds the additional salary and implementation costs, 
start hiring. Need a new manufacturing plant? Show that the construction costs can 
be recouped quickly and easily by the increase in revenues the plant will generate 
through new and improved products, and the initiative is approved.  
However, real-life business conditions are a lot more complicated. Your firm 
decides to go with an e-commerce strategy, but multiple strategic paths exist. Which 
path do you choose? What are the options you have? If you choose the wrong path, 
how do you get back on the right track? How do you value and prioritize the paths 
that exist? You are a venture capitalist firm with multiple business plans to consider. 
How do you value a start-up firm with no proven track record? How do you structure 
a mutually beneficial investment deal? What is the optimal timing for a second or 
third round of financing? 
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Real options are useful not only in valuing a firm through its strategic 
business options, but also as a strategic business tool in capital investment 
decisions. For instance, should a firm invest millions in a new facility expansion 
initiative? How does a firm choose among several seemingly cashless, costly, and 
unprofitable information-technology infrastructure projects? Should a firm indulge its 
billions in a risky research and development initiative? The consequences of a 
wrong decision can be disastrous or even terminal for certain firms. In a traditional 
discounted cash flow model, these questions cannot be answered with any certainty. 
In fact, some of the answers generated through the use of the traditional discounted 
cash flow model are flawed because the model assumes a static, one-time decision-
making process, whereas the real options approach takes into consideration the 
strategic managerial options that certain projects create under uncertainty and 
management’s flexibility in exercising or abandoning these options at different points 
in time, when the level of uncertainty has decreased or has become known over 
time.  
The Real Options Valuation (ROV) approach incorporates a learning model, 
such that management makes better and more informed strategic decisions when 
some levels of uncertainty are resolved through the passage of time, actions, and 
events. Traditional discounted cash flow analysis assumes a static investment 
decision and assumes that strategic decisions are made initially with no recourse to 
choose other pathways or options in the future. To create a good analogy of real 
options, visualize it as a strategic road map of long and winding roads with multiple 
perilous turns and branches along the way. Imagine the intrinsic and extrinsic value 
of having such a road map or global positioning system when navigating through 
unfamiliar territory, as well as having road signs at every turn to guide you in making 
the best and most informed driving decisions. Such a strategic map is the essence 
of real options. 
The answer to evaluating such projects lies in real options analysis, which 
can be used in a variety of settings, including pharmaceutical drug development, oil 
and gas exploration and production, manufacturing, start-up valuation, venture 
capital investment, information technology infrastructure, research and development, 
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mergers and acquisitions, e-commerce and e-business, intellectual capital 
development, technology development, facility expansion, business project 
prioritization, enterprise risk management, business unit capital budgeting, licenses, 
contracts, intangible asset valuation, and the like.  
A. The Real Options Solution in a Nutshell 
Simply defined, the real options method is a systematic approach and 
integrated solution using financial theory, economic analysis, management science, 
decision sciences, statistics, and econometric modeling in applying options theory in 
valuing real physical assets, as opposed to financial assets, in a dynamic and 
uncertain business environment where business decisions are flexible in the context 
of strategic capital investment decision-making, valuing investment opportunities, 
and project capital expenditures. Real options are crucial in 
 Identifying different acquisition or investment decision pathways or 
projects that management can navigate given highly uncertain business 
conditions 
 Valuing each of the strategic decision pathways and what they represent 
in terms of financial viability and feasibility 
 Prioritizing these pathways or projects based on a series of qualitative and 
quantitative metrics 
 Optimizing the value of strategic investment decisions by evaluating 
different decision paths under certain conditions or using a different 
sequence of pathways that can lead to the optimal strategy 
 Timing the effective execution of investments and finding the optimal 
trigger values and cost or revenue drivers 
 Managing existing or developing new optionalities and strategic decision 
pathways for future opportunities 
ROV is useful for valuing a project, alternative path, implementation option, or 
ship design through its strategic options especially in capital-intensive investment 
decisions under uncertainty. In a traditional cost-benefit and cash flow model, the 
ROI or cost-benefit question cannot be answered with any certainty. In fact, some of 
the answers generated using traditional cash flow models are flawed because the 
model assumes a static, one-time decision-making process with no recourse to 
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choose other pathways or options in the future. In contrast, the real options 
approach takes into consideration the strategic managerial options certain projects 
create under uncertainty and the decision-makers’ flexibility in exercising or 
abandoning these options at different points in time, when the level of uncertainty 
has decreased or has become known over time. 
B. Industry Leaders Embracing Strategic Real Options 
The first industries to use real options as a tool for strategic decision making 
were oil and gas and mining companies; its use later expanded into utilities, 
biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals; and now real options is used in 
telecommunications, high-tech, and across all industries. The following examples 
relate how real options have been or should be used in various kinds of companies.  
Automobile and Manufacturing Industry 
In the automobile and manufacturing industry, General Motors (GM) applies 
real options to create switching options in producing its new series of autos. This 
option is essentially to use a cheaper resource over a given period. GM holds 
excess raw materials and has multiple global vendors for similar materials with 
excess contractual obligations above what it projects as necessary. The excess 
contractual cost is outweighed by the significant savings of switching vendors when 
a certain raw material becomes too expensive in a particular region of the world. By 
spending the additional money in contracting with vendors and meeting their 
minimum purchase requirements, GM has essentially paid the premium on 
purchasing an option to switch, which is important especially when the price of raw 
materials fluctuates significantly in different regions around the world. Having an 
option here provides the holder a hedging vehicle against pricing risks. 
Computer Industry 
In the computer industry, HP–Compaq used to forecast sales in foreign 
countries months in advance. It then configured, assembled, and shipped the highly 
specific configuration printers to these countries. However, given that demand 
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changes rapidly and forecast figures are seldom correct, the preconfigured printers 
usually suffer the higher inventory holding cost or the cost of technological 
obsolescence. HP–Compaq can create an option to wait and defer making any 
decisions too early through building assembly plants in these foreign countries. Parts 
can then be shipped and assembled in specific configurations when demand is 
known, possibly weeks in advance rather than months in advance. These parts can 
be shipped anywhere in the world and assembled in any configuration necessary, 
while excess parts are interchangeable across different countries. The premium paid 
on this option is building the assembly plants, and the upside potential is the savings 
in making wrong demand forecasts.  
Airline Industry 
In the airline industry, Boeing spends billions of dollars and takes several 
years to decide if a certain aircraft model should even be built. If the wrong model is 
tested in this elaborate strategy, Boeing’s competitors may gain a competitive 
advantage relatively quickly. Because so many technical, engineering, market, and 
financial uncertainties are involved in the decision-making process, Boeing can 
conceivably create an option to choose through parallel development of multiple 
plane designs simultaneously, knowing well the increasing cost of developing 
multiple designs simultaneously with the sole purpose of eliminating all but one in 
the near future. The added cost is the premium paid on the option. However, Boeing 
will be able to decide which model to abandon or continue when these uncertainties 
and risks become known over time. Eventually, all the models will be eliminated 
save one. This way, the company can hedge itself against making the wrong initial 
decision and benefit from the knowledge gained through parallel development 
initiatives.  
Oil and Gas Industry 
In the oil and gas industry, companies spend millions of dollars to refurbish 
their refineries and add new technology to create an option to switch their mix of 
outputs among heating oil, diesel, and other petrochemicals as a final product, using 
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real options as a means of making capital and investment decisions. This option 
allows the refinery to switch its final output to one that is more profitable based on 
prevailing market prices, to capture the demand and price cyclicity in the market.  
Telecommunications Industry 
In the past, telecommunications companies like Sprint and AT&T installed 
more fiber-optic cable and other telecommunications infrastructure than any other 
company to create a growth option in the future by providing a secure and extensive 
network and to create a high barrier to entry, providing a first-to-market advantage. 
Imagine having to justify to the board of directors the need to spend billions of 
dollars on infrastructure that will not be used for years to come. Without the use of 
real options, this decision would have been impossible to justify.  
Real Estate Industry 
In the real estate arena, leaving land undeveloped creates an option to 
develop later at a more lucrative profit level. However, what is the optimal wait time 
or the optimal trigger price to maximize returns? In theory, one can wait for an 
infinite amount of time, and real options provide the solution for the optimal timing 
and optimal price trigger value.  
Utilities Industry 
In the utilities industry, firms have created an option to execute and an option 
to expand by installing cheap-to-build inefficient energy generator peaker plants to 
be used only when electricity prices are high and to shut down when prices are low. 
The price of electricity tends to remain constant until it hits a certain capacity 
utilization trigger level, when prices shoot up significantly. Although this occurs 
infrequently, the possibility still exists, and by having a cheap standby plant, the firm 
has created the option to turn on the expanded capacity generation whenever it 
becomes necessary, to capture this upside price fluctuation. 
Pharmaceutical Research and Development Industry  
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In pharmaceutical or research and development initiatives, real options can 
be used to justify the large investments in what seems to be cashless and 
unprofitable under the discounted cash flow method but actually creates sequential 
compound options in the future. Under the myopic lenses of a traditional discounted 
cash flow analysis, the high initial investment of, say, a billion dollars in research and 
development may return a highly uncertain projected few million dollars over the 
next few years. Management will conclude under a net present value analysis that 
the project is not financially feasible. However, a cursory look at the industry 
indicates that research and development is performed everywhere. Hence, 
management must see an intrinsic strategic value in research and development. 
How is this intrinsic strategic value quantified? The real options valuation approach 
would optimally time and spread the billion-dollar initial investment into a multiple-
stage investment structure. At each stage, management has an option to wait and 
see what happens as well as the option to abandon or the option to expand into the 
subsequent stages. The ability to defer cost and proceed only if situations are 
permissible creates value for the investment. 
High-Tech and e-Business Industry  
In e-business strategies, real options can be used to prioritize different e-
commerce initiatives and to justify those large initial investments that have an 
uncertain future. Real options can be used in e-commerce to create incremental 
investment stages compared to a large one-time investment (invest a little now, wait 
and see before investing more) as well as create options to abandon and other 
future growth options. 
Mergers and Acquisitions  
In valuing a firm for acquisition, you should consider not only the revenues 
and cash flows generated from the firm’s operations but also the strategic options 
that come with the firm. For instance, if the acquired firm does not operate up to 
expectations, an abandonment option can be executed where it can be sold for its 
intellectual property and other tangible assets. If the firm is highly successful, it can 
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be spun off into other industries and verticals or new products and services can be 
eventually developed through the execution of an expansion option. In fact, in 
mergers and acquisition, several strategic options exist. For instance, a firm acquires 
other entities to enlarge its existing portfolio of products or geographic location or to 
obtain new technology (expansion option); or to divide the acquisition into many 
smaller pieces and sell them off as in the case of a corporate raider (abandonment 
option); or it merges to form a larger organization due to certain synergies and 
immediately lays off many of its employees (contraction option). If the seller does not 
value its real options, it may be leaving money on the negotiation table. If the buyer 
does not value these strategic options, it is undervaluing a potentially highly lucrative 
acquisition target.  
C. Knowledge Value Added (KVA) 
In the U.S. military context, the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology 
has been used for approaching the problems of estimating the productivity (in terms 
of ROI) for military capabilities embedded in processes that are impacted by 
technology. KVA partially addresses the requirements of the many DoD policies and 
directives by providing a means to generate comparable value or benefit estimates 
for various processes and the technologies and people that execute them. It does 
this by providing a common and relatively objective means for estimating the value 
of new technologies as required by the following: 
 Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 that mandates the assessment of the cost 
benefits for information technology investments. 
 Government Accountability Office’s (formerly the General Accounting 
Office) Assessing Risks and Returns: A Guide for Evaluating Federal 
Agencies’ IT Investment Decision-Making, Version 1, which requires that 
IT investments apply ROI measures.  
 DoD Directive 8115.01, which mandates the use of performance metrics 
based on outputs, with ROI analysis required for all current and planned IT 
investments.  
 DoD’s Risk Management Guidance Defense Acquisition Guidebook that 
requires alternatives to the traditional cost estimation be considered 
because legacy cost models tend not to adequately address costs 
associated with information systems or the risks associated with them.  
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KVA is a methodology that describes all organizational outputs in common 
units, thus providing a means to compare the outputs of all assets (human, machine, 
information technology) regardless of the aggregated outputs produced. It can be 
used to monetize the outputs of all assets, including intangible knowledge assets, by 
generating market-comparable estimates of the price per common unit of output. 
Thus, the KVA approach can provide insights about the productivity level of 
processes, people, and systems in terms of a ratio of common units of output (CUO) 
divided by the cost to produce the CUOs. By capturing the value of knowledge 
embedded in an organization’s core processes, employees, and technology, KVA 
identifies the cost and value of people, systems, and processes. Because KVA 
identifies every process required to produce an output and the historical costs of 
those processes, unit costs and unit values of outputs, processes, functions, or 
services are calculated. An output is defined as the result of an organization’s 
operations; it can be a product or service, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Organizational Operations 
For the purpose of this study, KVA was used to measure the value added by 
the human capital assets (i.e., military personnel and systems used in executing the 
processes) and the system assets (e.g., new sensor, weapons system) by analyzing 
the performances of the processes. By capturing the value of knowledge embedded 
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in systems and used by operators of the processes, KVA identified the productivity 
of the system-process alternatives. Because KVA identifies every process output 
required to produce the final aggregated output, the common unit costs and the 
common unit values were estimated.  
The KVA methodology has been applied in over 80 projects within the DoD, 
from flight scheduling applications to ship maintenance, building, and modernization. 
In general, the KVA methodology was used for this study because it could 
 Compare alternative approaches in terms of their relative productivity 
 Allocate value and costs to common units of output 
 Measure value added by the system alternatives based on the outputs 
each produced 
 Relate outputs to cost of producing those outputs in common units 
KVA quantifies value in two key productivity metrics: Return on Knowledge 
(ROK) and Return on Knowledge Investment (ROKI). Calculations of these key 
metrics are shown in Figure 2. 





Function or process 
level performance ratio 
Benefits in common units or 
cost to produce the output 
Return on 
Investment (ROI) 
Same as ROI at the sub-
corporate or process level 
Traditional investment 
finance ratio 
[Revenue – Investment Cost] 
/ [Investment Cost] 
Figure 2: Knowledge Value Added Metrics 
Although ROI is the traditional financial ratio, ROK reflects how well a specific 
process converts existing knowledge into producing outputs so decision-makers can 
quantify costs and measure value derived from investments in human capital and 
information technology assets. A higher ROK signifies better utilization of knowledge 
assets. If IT investments do not improve the ROK value of a given process, steps 
must be taken to improve that process’s function and performance (see Figure 3).  
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Review Task 1,000 
Determine OP 1,000 
Input Search Function 2,500 
Search/Collection 1,000 
Target Data Acquisition  1,000 
Target Data Processing  2,000 
Format Report   600 
Quality Control Report      700 
Transmit Report 1,600 
Total                   $11,400 
 
 
Figure 3: Accounting and Process-Based Costing 
Based on the tenets of complexity theory, KVA assumes that humans and 
technology in organizations add value by taking inputs and changing them 
(measured in common units of complexity or change) into outputs through core 
processes. The amount of change an asset within a process produces can be 
described as a measure of value or benefit at a given point in time. The additional 
assumptions in KVA include the following: 
 Describing all process outputs in common units (e.g., using a knowledge 
metaphor for the descriptive language in terms of the time it takes an 
average employee to learn how to produce the outputs) allows historical 
value and cost data to be assigned to those processes historically. 
 All outputs can be described in terms of the time required for a single point 
of reference learner to learn to produce them.  
 Learning Time, a surrogate for procedural knowledge required to produce 
process outputs, is measured in common units of time. Consequently, 
units of learning time are proportional to common units of output.  
 Common units of output make it possible to compare all outputs in terms 
of cost per unit as well as value (e.g., price) per unit, because value (e.g., 
revenue) can now be assigned at the suborganizational level. 
 Once cost and revenue streams have been assigned to suborganizational 
outputs, normal accounting, financial performance, and profitability metrics 
can be applied. 
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Describing processes in common units also permits, but does not require, 
market comparable data to be generated, particularly important for nonprofits such 
as the U.S. military. Using a market comparables approach, data from the 
commercial sector can be used to estimate price per common unit, allowing for 
revenue estimates of process outputs for nonprofits. This approach also provides a 
common-unit basis to define benefit streams regardless of the process analyzed.  
KVA differs from other nonprofit ROI models because it can allow for 
revenue estimates, enabling the use of traditional accounting, financial performance, 
and profitability measures at the suborganizational level. KVA can rank processes or 
process alternatives by their relative ROIs. These rankings assist decision-makers in 
identifying how much various processes or process alternatives add value.  
In KVA, value is quantified in two key metrics: Return on Knowledge (ROK, 
revenue/cost) and ROI (revenue-investment cost/investment cost). The raw data 
from a KVA analysis can become the input into the ROI models and various 
forecasting techniques such as real options analysis, portfolio optimization, and 
Monte Carlo simulation. 
D. Integrated Risk Management (IRM) 
Integrated Risk Management (IRM) is an eight-step, quantitative software-
based modeling approach for the objective quantification of risk (cost, schedule, 
technical), flexibility, strategy, and decision analysis. The method can be applied to 
program management, resource portfolio allocation, return on investment to the 
military (maximizing expected military value and objective value quantification of 
nonrevenue government projects), analysis of alternatives or strategic flexibility 
options, capability analysis, prediction modeling, and general decision analytics. The 
method and toolset provide the ability to consider hundreds of alternatives with 
budget and schedule uncertainty and provide ways to help the decision-maker 
maximize capability and readiness at the lowest cost. This methodology is 
particularly amenable to resource reallocation and has been taught and applied by 
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the author for the past 10 years at over 100 multinational corporations and over 30 
projects at the DoD.  
IRM provides a structured approach that will yield a rapid, credible, 
repeatable, scalable, and defensible analysis of cost savings and total cost of 
ownership while ensuring that vital capabilities are not lost in the process. The IRM + 
KVA methods do this by estimating the value of a system or process in a common 
and objective way across various alternatives and providing the return on investment 
(ROI) of each in ways that are both comparable and rigorous. These ROI estimates 
across the portfolio of alternatives provide the inputs necessary to predict the value 
of various options. IRM incorporates risks, uncertainties, budget constraints, 
implementation, life-cycle costs, reallocation options, and total ownership costs in 
providing a defensible analysis describing management options for the path forward. 
This approach identifies risky projects and programs, while projecting immediate and 
future cost savings, total life-cycle costs, flexible alternatives, critical success factors, 
strategic options for optimal implementation paths/decisions, and portfolio 
optimization. Its employment presents ways for identifying the potential for cost 
overruns and schedule delays and enables proactive measures to mitigate those 
risks. IRM provides an optimized portfolio of capability or implementation options 
while maintaining the value of strategic flexibility. 
In the current case, IRM provides a way to differentiate among various 
alternatives for implementation of FASO/MAS with respect to options in ship design, 
and to postulate where the greatest benefit could be achieved for the available 
investment from within the portfolio of alternatives. As a strategy is formed and a 
plan developed for its implementation, the toolset provides for inclusion of important 
risk factors, such as schedule and technical uncertainty, and allows for continuous 
updating and evaluation by the program manager to understand where these risks 
come into play and to make informed decisions accordingly. 
Using Monte Carlo risk simulation, the resulting stochastic KVA ROK model 
yields a distribution of values rather than a point solution. Thus, simulation models 
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analyze and quantify the various risks and uncertainties of each program. The result 
is a distribution of the ROKs and a representation of the project’s volatility.  
In real options, the analyst assumes that the underlying variable is the future 
benefit minus the cost of the project. An implied volatility can be calculated through 
the results of a Monte Carlo risk simulation. The results for the IRM analysis will be 
built on the quantitative estimates provided by the KVA analysis. The IRM will 
provide defensible quantitative risk analytics and portfolio optimization suggesting 
the best way to allocate limited resources to ensure the highest possible value over 
time.  
The first step in real options is to generate a strategic map through the 
process of framing the problem. Based on the overall problem identification 
occurring during the initial qualitative management screening process, certain 
strategic options would become apparent for each project. The strategic options 
could include, among other things, the option to wait, expand, contract, abandon, 
switch, stage-gate, and choose.  
Risk analysis and real options analysis assume that the future is uncertain, 
and that decision-makers can make midcourse corrections when these uncertainties 
become resolved or risk distributions become known. The analysis is usually done 
ahead of time and thus, ahead of such uncertainty and risks. Therefore, when these 
risks become known, the analysis should be revisited to incorporate the information 
in decision-making or to revise any input assumptions. Sometimes, for long-horizon 
projects, several iterations of the real options analysis should be performed, where 
future iterations are updated with the latest data and assumptions. Understanding 
the steps required to undertake an IRM analysis is important because the 
methodology provides insight not only into the methodology itself but also into how 
IRM evolves from traditional analyses, showing where the traditional approach ends 
and where the new analytics start. 
The risk simulation step required in the IRM provides us with the probability 
distributions and confidence intervals of the KVA methodology’s resulting ROI and 
ROK results. Further, one of the outputs from this risk simulation is volatility, a 
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measure of risk and uncertainty, which is a required input into the real options 
valuation computations. In order to assign input probabilistic parameters and 
distributions into the simulation models, we relied on the U.S. Air Force’s Cost 
Analysis Agency (AFCAA) handbook, as seen in Figure 4. In the handbook, the 
three main distributions recommended are the triangular, normal, and uniform 
distributions. We chose the triangular distribution because the limits (minimum and 
maximum) are known, and its shape resembles the normal distribution, with the 
most likely values having the highest probability of occurrence and the extreme ends 
(minimum and maximum values) having considerably lower probabilities of 
occurrence. Also, the triangular distribution was chosen instead of the normal 
distribution because the latter’s tail ends extend toward positive and negative 
infinities, making it less applicable in the model we are developing. Finally, the 
AFCAA Handbook also provides options for left skew, right skew, and symmetrical 
distributions. In our analysis, we do not have sufficient historical or comparable data 
to make the proper assessment of skew and, hence, revert to the default of a 
symmetrical triangular distribution. 
Figure 5 shows the steps required in a comprehensive IRM process. 
 
 
Figure 4: Probability Distributions (USAF Cost Analysis Agency Handbook)
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Figure 5: Integrated Risk Management Methodology 
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V. Real Options Valuation Applications in the U.S. 
Department of Defense 
This section provides a quick snapshot of the various ROV option types and 
their relevance to the DoD in general, as well as applications within the scope of the 
current research. 
A. Option to Wait and Defer (Ability to Wait Before Executing) 
An option to wait and defer allows the holder the option, but not the obligation, 
to execute a certain strategy when situations make it optimal to do so.  
 A portfolio of capabilities and readiness for immediate deployment can be 
created and maintained with the use of options to defer. If the 
predeveloped payload or platform options exist, they will allow rapid 
change out of equipment and integration of new weapons or electronics 
systems, without the excessive schedule and cost penalties. 
 Options to defer allow ship designers to incorporate modernization and 
upgrade options into the ship design early on, and to defer the exact 
configuration of the ship until a future date when uncertainties on 
capability requirements are resolved over the passage of time (midlife of 
the ship’s lifespan), actions (new missions), and events (wartime, 
peacetime). 
 By creating design options and design flexibility specifically for mission 
and weapon systems that are anticipated to have the maximum change 
over the lifespan of a ship, and at the same time using common bow and 
stern configurations, any changes in future capability requirements can be 
accommodated quickly and cheaply. 
 Other applications within the DoD include 
o Build or buy options (buy versus lease options). That is, should a 
technology be developed internally, or should commercially available 
off-the-shelf applications be used? 
o Multiple contracts and vendors. Having multiple vendors or contracts 
in place that may or not be executed increases the chances of 
corporate survivorship and an existing military industrial base to 
ensure future uncertain demands are met. 
o Capitalizing on other opportunities while reducing large-scale 
implementation risks and determining the value of P3I and R&D 
(parallel implementation of alternatives while waiting on technical 
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success of the main project, and no need to delay the project 
because of one bad component in the project). 
o Low rate initial production (LRIP), advanced weapons R&D, 
advanced technology demonstrations, and weapons and systems 
prototyping. Provide the right of first refusal to test and see the 
results (deferring the final decision) until the outcomes of said trials 
are evident. 
o There is significant Value of Information in forecasting cost inputs, 
capability requirements, schedule risks, and other key decision 
metrics by deferring decisions until a later date but having the option 
ready to be triggered at a moment’s notice. 
o Military intervention strategies include the naval option, the air option, 
go-long versus go-deep versus go-home option, first strike option, 
surge option, force mix option, and deterrent options. 
B. Option to Switch (Ability to Switch Applications) 
An option to switch allows the holder the right, but not the requirement or 
obligation, to maintain the current status quo or to switch among a variety of 
predetermined options. The decision on which option to execute is deferred until a 
future date when exact needs and specifications are known, and the optimal option 
is then executed.  
 Standardization and modularity. By incorporating options to ensure ISO 
standards for containers, tie-down systems, mission bays, and support 
structures, ships can take on multi-mission payloads quickly and 
efficiently. 
 Flexible infrastructure options within a ship, such as open power, open 
HVAC, open data cabling, open outfitting, and open structure, allow ships 
to be adaptable and reconfigured for different missions quickly without 
major rework such as stripping and welding. 
 Other applications within the DoD include 
o Switching vendors in Open Architecture (OA) and modular concepts 
allows the U.S. Navy to use multiple vendors for similar parts, 
ensuring healthy price and quality competition sustainment in the 
industry, as well as existing parts suppliers for the future. 
o Readiness and capability risk mitigation can be obtained through 
ensuring multiple vendors and a strong military industrial base.  
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C. Simultaneous Compound Option (Parallel Development) 
Simultaneous and parallel development efforts are sometimes used to reduce 
critical path and schedule risks. The risk of technical failures during development or 
schedule delays, especially when speed is critical, are mitigated with this 
simultaneous option where multiple systems are designed in parallel.  
 By designing multiple payloads (combat subsystems or electronic 
subsystems) in parallel with the platform (ship design), newer weapons 
systems may be ready for integration into the platform years earlier. 
 Other applications within the DoD include 
o Simultaneous test programs (aircraft flight demonstrations and 
contract competitions) 
o Development of multiple and simultaneous weapons systems 
D. Portfolio Option (Basket of Options to Execute) 
A portfolio of options provides the holder a variety or basket of possible option 
paths to execute. Some of these options may be too expensive, be consistently 
dominated by other options, take too long to execute, or simply be nonviable 
options. Determining the optimal portfolio of warfighter capabilities to develop and 
field within budgetary and time constraints is key to solving and modeling a portfolio 
optimization problem.  
 Facilitates the determination of the optimal portfolios that provide the 
maximum capability, flexibility, and cost effectiveness with minimal risks 
given budget, schedule, wartime, and other scenarios. For instance, if 
Congress authorizes additional funding or cuts existing funding to certain 
programs, which capabilities or features should be added or cut? 
 Helps to model and determine how much flexibility in design options 
should be incorporated into a FASO/MAS ship. Investing too little in 
flexibility will result in excessive modernization costs and increased 
downtime of the ship or its early retirement before the end of the design 
service life. Investing too much will create excess flexibility that will not be 
used and create a higher up-front cost to obtain these flexibility options. 
 Allows for different flexible pathways: Mutually Exclusive (C1 or C2 but not 
both), Platform Technology (C3 requires C2, but C2 can be stand-alone; 
expensive and worth less if considered by itself without accounting for 
flexibility downstream options it provides for the next phase), expansion 
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options, abandonment options, and parallel development or simultaneous 
compound options. 
 Other applications within the DoD include 
o Determining testing required in modular systems, mean-time-to-
failure estimates, and replacement and redundancy requirements to 
maintain desired readiness and availability levels 
o Maintaining capability and readiness at various levels 
o Force mix options 
o Capability selection and sourcing across a spectrum of vendors 
E. Sequential Compound Option (Proof of Concept, Milestones, and 
Stage-Gate Development) 
The DoD has a requirement for advanced technology to meet warfighter 
needs, but the technologies needed are in the early stages of maturity, and it is 
highly risky whether the technologies will be available or work when finally 
incorporated. There are limited vendors/activities capable of undertaking the 
development, so the program office may mitigate downside risks to the program 
through a phased approach to the acquisition. For instance, in the first phase, the 
vendor develops the underlying technology and presents the results to the PEO with 
a preliminary design. At the end of this phase, the government can either choose to 
continue through development of a prototype system or harvest the Science and 
Technology work for later use and abandon the effort. On delivery of a working 
prototype, the government will conduct tests for performance, evaluate total life-
cycle cost, and decide whether to continue to full-scale system development or to 
abandon the effort, salvaging the knowledge from the prototyping effort for later use. 
An acquisition program manager should recognize that multiple approaches 
to the problem are possible and may decide to pursue a course of parallel 
development in which a variety of vendors and government labs undertake work to 
propose a technology solution, which creates a Multiple Activity or Multiple Vendor 
development of a system or technology. At option points (generally one to two years 
after contract award), the various solutions will be evaluated for performance, 
technical merit, and cost, and the universe of participants reduced through a down-
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select process. After two (or pick a number) rounds, the two most promising 
approaches are selected for advanced development and prototyping. From those, 
the best (evaluated in terms of performance, risk, and cost) will be selected for final 
development and fielding. 
For example, the U.S. Navy is currently pursuing the applications of new 3D 
scanning technology onboard a ship to streamline the planning process for depot-
level repair work. If the technology works after any technical problems have been 
ironed out, the scope can be expanded to implement online collaborative tools 
(requires additional investment) to implement additional process efficiencies for the 
management of depot-level ship repairs. Expansions across the population of naval 
shipyards will extend the savings/return on investment. 
Pursuing Open Architecture (OA) over multiple stages by first performing a 
proof of concept stage and then executing several small-scale implementations and 
a final larger-scale implementation is another example of a sequential option. For 
instance, try OA modular development on a shore-based test system to see whether 
it works before fielding on all units of that class in the fleet once all the bugs are 
worked out and only if the proof of concept results are encouraging, thereby 
reducing the risk while at the same time obtaining the additional upside potential of 
going to OA (lower downtime, reduced cycle-time, reduced cost, interchangeable 
parts, at-sea repairs, multiple vendor parts for one system instead of relying only on 
a single vendor for the entire system). Successful implementation of a component or 
technology in one ship class also provides the opportunity in an OA environment to 
expand to integrate the capability/technology into other open architected systems for 
other ship classes. 
F. Expansion Option (Platform Technology with Spinoff 
Capabilities) 
The C-17 Globemaster III is a long-range cargo/transport aircraft that has 
been operated by the U.S. Air Force since 1993. Full-scale development of the C-17 
got underway in 1986, but technical problems and funding shortfalls delayed the 
program. Despite those difficulties, the C-17 retained broad support from Congress. 
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In April 1990, Defense Secretary Cheney reduced the projected buy from 210 to 120 
planes, exercising a contraction option. By the mid-1990s, the program’s difficulties 
had been largely resolved. In 1996, the DoD approved plans for more C-17s and 
planned to end the production at 180 aircraft in FY2007. Congress then approved 
another $2 billion for 10 additional C-17 aircraft in FY2008. Expansion options put in 
place allowed the smooth addition of aircraft as needed, including foreign military 
sales. Other applications within the DoD include 
 Platform Technologies 
 Acquisitions 
 ACTD follow-on 
 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
 Reusability and Scalability Options 
 
G. Abandonment Option (Salvage and Walk Away) 
A DoD research and development organization in conjunction with a military 
contractor decides to enter a joint-testing agreement to test a satellite-based voice 
recognition intelligence gathering hardware-software product combination currently 
in its infancy stage of development that, if successful, could potentially be very 
useful in the fight against terrorism. The DoD can hedge its risks (i.e., the risk is the 
potential that the hardware-software combination will not work as required) and 
invest a small sum to buy the right of first refusal for a future investment for some 
prespecified amount that is agreed upon now. This way, the U.S. Navy gets to 
participate in the technology if it is successful but risks only a little if it is 
unsuccessful. In deciding whether to purchase the intelligence gathering equipment, 
a military analyst values the potential to abandon and sell off or divest the assets of 
the company in the future should there be no further use of the technology or if a 
newer and much more potent technology arrives on the market. The ability to do so 
will, in fact, reduce the risk on what the military should spend on the technology and 
allows it to recoup some of its potential losses. Other applications within the DoD 
include 
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 Exit and salvage to cut losses 
 Stop before executing the next phase 
 Termination for convenience (T-for-C) 
H. Contraction Option (Partnerships and Cost/Risk Reduction) 
A contraction option allows two parties to create a joint venture or partnership 
(e.g., a DoD and military vendor partnership) whereby the DoD agrees to purchase 
certain quantities of a product while holding partial intellectual property rights to the 
new development. Risks of failure are shared between the two parties, and no single 
party will bear all the risks (the DoD hedges its downside risks of the product failing, 
and the vendor hedges its risks of the DoD not being interested in its product). Other 
applications within the DoD include 
 Outsourcing, Alliances, Contractors 
 Joint Inter-Service Venture and Foreign Partnerships 
I. Comparing Traditional Analysis Results With Real Options 
Results 
We begin by discussing the comparison between the real options process 
and traditional financial analysis. Senior management is always skeptical about 
using new, fancy analytics when old methods have served them so well in the past. 
It would seem that the main approach to alleviate management’s concerns is to 
show that the real options methodology does not differ that much––in principle, at 
least––from the conventions of traditional financial analysis. As a matter of fact, 
traditional discounted cash flow analysis can be seen as a special case of real 
options analysis when there is negligible uncertainty. That is, when the underlying 
asset’s volatility approaches zero, the real options value approaches zero, and the 
value of the project is exactly as defined in a discounted cash flow model. It is only 
when uncertainty exists, and management has the flexibility to defer making 
midcourse corrections until uncertainty becomes resolved through time, actions, and 
events, that a project has option value.  
Change-management specialists have found that there are several criteria to 
be met before a paradigm shift in thinking is found to be acceptable in a corporation. 
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For example, in order for senior management to accept a new and novel set of 
analytical approaches, the models and processes themselves must have 
applicability to the problem at hand, and not be merely an academic exercise. As we 
have seen previously, the former is certainly true in that large multinationals have 
embraced the concept of real options with significant fervor, and that real options are 
here to stay. It is not simply an academic exercise, nor is it the latest financial 
analysis fad that is here today and gone tomorrow. In addition, the process and 
methodology have to be consistent, accurate, and replicable. That is, it passes the 
scientific process: Given similar assumptions, historical data and assertions, one can 
replicate the results with ease and predictability.  
Next, the new method must provide a compelling value-added proposition. 
Otherwise, it is nothing but a fruitless and time-consuming exercise. The time, 
resources, and effort expended must be met and even surpassed by the method’s 
value-add. This is certainly the case in larger capital investment initiatives, where a 
firm’s future or the future of a business unit may be at stake. Other major criteria 
include the ability to provide the user a comparative advantage over competitors, 
which is certainly the case when the additional valuable insights generated through 
real options analysis will help management identify options and value, prioritize, and 
select strategic alternatives that may otherwise be overlooked.  
Finally, in order to accept a change in mind-set, the new methodology, 
process, or model must be easy to explain and understand. In addition, there has to 
be a link to previously acceptable methods, whether it is an extension of the old or a 
replacement of the old due to some clear superior attributes. These last two points 
are the most difficult to tackle for an analyst. The sets of criteria prior to this are 
direct and easy to define. However, how does one explain to senior management 
the complexities of real options and that the approach is the next best thing since 
sliced bread? How do real options extend the old paradigm of discounted cash flow 
models with which management has been brought up? An effective method that the 
author has found useful with clients has been to boil it down to its simplest parts, as 
shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Enhanced Return With Risk Reduction 
In a traditional financial analysis, the analyst usually calculates the net 
present value (NPV), which simply defined is benefits less cost (first equation), 
where benefits equal the sum of the present values of future net cash flows after 
taxes, discounted at some market risk-adjusted cost of capital, and cost equals the 
present value of investment costs discounted at the risk-free rate or reinvestment 
rate. Management is usually knowledgeable of NPV and the way it is calculated. 
Conventional wisdom is such that if benefits outweigh costs, that is, when NPV is 
positive, one would be inclined to accept a particular project. This is simple and 
intuitive enough. However, when we turn to options theory, the call option is also 
nothing but benefits less cost (second equation) with a slight modification. The 
In order for a new methodology to be accepted, it must be: 
Accurate  Applicable  Comparable 
Consistent  Explainable  Precise 
Replicable  Understandable Value-Adding 
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difference is the introduction of a (d) multiplier behind benefits and costs. 
Obviously, then, the multipliers are nothing but the respective probabilities of 
occurrence.  
Hence, in Real Options theory, one can very simply define the value of an 
option as nothing but benefits less costs, taking into account the risk or probabilities 
of occurrence for each variable. It is easy to understand that option value in this 
case is far superior to the NPV analysis because it provides an added element of 
stochastic variability around benefits and costs. It is hubris to say that we know for 
certain (on a deterministic level) what future benefits and costs will be when, in 
reality, business conditions change daily. In addition, we can say that the total 
strategic value or expanded net present value (eNPV), shown as equation three in 
Figure 6, is the sum of the deterministic base case NPV and the strategic flexibility 
option value. The option value takes into account the value of flexibility, that is, the 
option to execute on a strategic option but not the obligation to do so. The eNPV 
accounts for both base case analysis plus the added value of managerial flexibility. If 
there is negligible uncertainty, volatility approaches zero, which means that the 
probability multiplier approaches one (outcomes are certain). The options equation 
reverts back to the NPV equation, indicating that the NPV analysis is a special case 
of an options analysis when there is no uncertainty.  
Finally, the two graphs in Figure 6 tell a compelling story of why real options 
provide an important insight into decision analysis. The first graph in the background 
shows the distribution of the base case NPV analysis. That is, the first moment, or 
the mean, median, and mode of the graph, shows the central tendency location of 
the most likely occurrence of a project’s value. Some analysts will call this the 
expected value of the project (denoted as avg for average or expected value). The 
second moment, or the standard deviation, width, variance, and range of the 
distribution, tells of the risk of the project. That is, a wider distribution implies a 
higher risk because there is a wider range of outcomes the project value may fall 
between. Clearly, the graph in the foreground shows a much smaller risk structure 
but a higher average return, which is attributable to real options analysis. We know 
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from many previous illustrations that employing a real options strategy––for 
example, the passive and active options to wait––will create a higher value because 
we are hedging project risks by not betting the entire investment outlay now but 
instead waiting until we get a better idea of the uncertainty that exists over time. 
Once uncertainty becomes resolved, we can act accordingly. This delaying action 
helps hedge our losses and thus truncates the distribution in terms of width and 
moves it to the right because management will never execute a bad strategy 
assuming they know what will happen if they do. This moves the entire distribution to 
the right and at the same time reduces the risk, as seen through a reduction in width. 
Thus, real options, just like its cousins the financial options, help the holder of the 
option to hedge project risk (lower second moment) while increasing its financial 
returns leverage (higher first moment).   
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VI. FASO/MAS at PEO-SHIPS: Flexibility Options for 
Guided Missile Destroyers  
A. DDG 51 FLIGHT III 
The Arleigh Burke class of Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG) is the U.S. 
Navy’s first class of destroyer built around the Aegis Combat System and the SPY-
1D multi-function passive electronically scanned array radar. The class is named for 
Admiral Arleigh Burke, the most famous American destroyer officer of World War II 
and later chief of naval operations. The class leader, USS Arleigh Burke, was 
commissioned during Admiral Burke’s lifetime (Office of the Director, Operational 
Test and Evaluation [DOT&E], 2013). 
The DDG class ships were designed as multi-mission destroyers to fit the 
AAW role with their powerful Aegis radar and surface-to-air missiles; the anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) role with their towed sonar array, anti-submarine rockets, 
and ASW helicopter; the anti-surface warfare (ASuW) role with their Harpoon missile 
launcher; and the strategic land strike role with their Tomahawk missiles. With 
upgrades to AN/SPY-1 phased radar systems and their associated missile payloads, 
as part of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, members of this class have 
also begun to demonstrate some promise as mobile anti-ballistic missile and anti-
satellite weaponry platforms. Some versions of the class no longer have the towed 
sonar or Harpoon missile launcher (DOT&E, 2013). 
The DDG 51 class destroyers have been designed to support carrier strike 
groups, surface action groups, amphibious groups, and replenishment groups. They 
perform primarily AAW with secondary land attack, ASW, and ASuW capabilities. 
The MK41 vertical launch system has expanded the role of the destroyers in strike 
warfare, as well as their overall performance. 
The U.S. Navy will use the DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer equipped with the 
Aegis Modernization program and AMDR to provide joint battlespace threat 
awareness and defense capability to counter current and future threats in support of 
joint forces ashore and afloat.   
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Step 1: Identification of FASO/MAS Options 
The following provides two high-level examples of identifying and framing 
strategic flexibility options in the DDG 51 and DDG1000 environments. These are 
only notional examples with rough order magnitude values to illustrate the options 
framing approach. 
Power Plant Options 
This real options example illustrates the implications of the standard LM2500 
GE Marine Gas Turbines for DDG 51 FLT III ships versus the Rolls-Royce MT30 
Marine Gas Turbine Engines for the Zumwalt DDG 1000, where the latter can satisfy 
large power requirements in warships. The LM2500 provides 105,000 shaft hp for a 
four-engine plant. In comparison, the MT30 can generate upwards of 35.4 MW, and 
its auxiliary RR4500 Rolls-Royce turbine generators can produce an added 3.8 MW, 
and each DDG1000 carries two MT30s and two RR4500s. This means that the 
combined energy output from the Zumwalt can fulfil the electricity demands in a 
small- to medium-sized city. In contrast, two LM2500 gas turbines can only produce 
a total of 95.2 kW, which is approximately 0.12% or 1/825 of the power the Zumwalt 
can produce. Manufacturer specifications indicate that the LM2500 has an 
associated Cost/kW of energy of $0.34 and the MT30 Cost/kW is $0.37. In addition, 
the MT30 prevents warships from running off balance when an engine cannot be 
restarted until it has cooled down, as is the case in the LM2500. 
Figure 7 illustrates a real options strategy tree with four mutually exclusive 
paths. Additional strategies and pathways can be similarly created, but these initial 
strategies are sufficient to illustrate the options framing approach. Path 1 shows the 
As-Is strategy, where no additional higher capacity power plant is used; that is, only 
two standard LM2500 units are deployed, maintain zero design margins for growth, 
and only the requirements for the current ship configuration are designed and built. 
Medium and large upgrades will require major ship alterations, with high cost and 
delayed schedule. Path 2 implements the two required LM2500 units with additional 
and sufficient growth margins for one MT30 power plant but currently only with a 
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smaller power plant incorporated into the design. Sufficient area or modularity is 
available where parts of the machinery can be removed and replaced with the higher 
energy production unit if needed. Upfront cost is reduced, while future cost and 
schedule delays are also reduced. Path 3 is to have two prebuilt MT30s and 
RR4500s initially. While providing the fastest implementation pathway, the cost is 
higher in the beginning, but total cost is lower if, indeed, higher energy weapons will 
be implemented. Path 4 is an option to switch whereby one LM2500 is built with one 
MT30 unit. Depending on conditions, either the LM2500 or MT30 will be used 
(switched between units). When higher-powered future weapons are required, such 
as electromagnetic railguns (E.M. Rail Guns) or high-intensity lasers (H. I. Lasers) 
as well as other similarly futuristic weapons and systems, the MT30 can be turned 
on. 
Having a warship flexibility with two LM2500s (As-Is base case) allows the 
Navy a savings of $31.76 million by deferring the option of the other two additional 
LM2500s. Therefore, having a flexible ship, the Navy can invest later in one LM2500 
and attach another MT30 (preventing any engine off-balance effects when the 
engines cannot be restarted due to excessive heat) and can save $34.58 million. 
The usage of options to defer/invest that combine gas turbine specifications allows 
the Navy to prevent high sunk costs, properly adjusting the true kW requirements, 
and allows different combinations of propulsion and energy plants. This analysis can 
be further extended into any direction as needed based on ship designs and Navy 
requirements.  
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Figure 7: Options Framing on Power Generation 
 
Vertical Launch Systems 
Another concern of the DoD is the large capital investment required in vertical 
launch systems (VLSs) in U.S. Navy ships. VLSs need to be developed and 
integrated per Navy requirements, which are constrained by rapid technological 
change and high uncertainties in costs. The usage of strategic real options aims to 
assess whether the Navy can keep the option open to defer the large investments to 
help avoid high sunk costs and quick technological obsolescence or should pre-
invest in a new VLS. Consequently, flexibility and uncertainty create the right 
environment to model VLSs using a real options framework. According to DDG 51 
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(Flight II and Flight III) specifications, the estimated cost of a single VLS is 
approximately $228 million. The most expensive subarea is the MK41 subsystem 
(DDG 51 contains two MK41s). This current example is developed based on the 
assumptions of a rapid technological obsolescence, high integration costs, time 
delays, and reduced capability, which can all jeopardize Navy investments in the 
VLS. 
In addition, using a real options framework to possibly defer the 
implementation of MK41 would allow ship designers and engineers to incorporate 
modernization and upgrade margins in the VLS within the ship design early on, and 
to defer the exact configuration of the VLS until a future date when uncertainties on 
capability requirements (i.e., integration, upgrades, changes, new technology, new 
requirements, updated military warfighter needs) are resolved over the passage of 
time, action, and events. Also, we can evaluate the option to invest in the second or 
third MK41 as the situational needs arise. Figure 8 shows the two simple option 
paths, in which the first path indicates immediate execution where two MK1s are 
implemented immediately, not knowing if both are actually needed, as opposed to 
the second strategic path where the VLS is designed such that either two MK1s can 
be implemented or only one. Therefore, one MK1 can be first inserted and the 
second added on later only when required, where the VLS has design growth 
margins to adapt to slightly different technological configurations. The question, of 
course, is which strategic pathway makes most sense, as computed using strategic 
real options value. 
When the flexibility value is added into the mix, the expected total cost is 
reduced from $110.10 million to $98.51 million. Finally, wartime scenarios can be 
incorporated into the analysis whereby if there is a higher probability of conflict 
where the VLS is required, the value to keep open the option to defer is reduced and 
the Navy is better off executing the option immediately and having the required VLS 
in place. 
The project with flexibility is $118.22 million (flexible VLS warship open to 
integrate another MK41 in the future as and when needed) against $228.34 million 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 78 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
(base case DDG 51 with no flexibility options, where the VLS is already built in). The 
Navy can save or delay the usage of $110.10 million in cost by holding on to the 
option of deferring the second MK41. In addition, in the near future, the cost to 
implement the second MK41 can be reduced due to a flatter learning curve, 
economies of scale, and the specific technology becoming more readily available, 
less complex, and easier to implement, or it can be more expensive because the 
technology experiences new updates, higher performance, and greater efficiency. If 
cost volatility is the main variable for the Navy, we contrast deferring the second 
MK41 against the base case. It means that we compare the VLS system with no 
flexibility ($228.32 million) against the cost changes in the second MK41 (assuming 
Navy engineers develop a plug-and-play structure to integrate the next MK41 
quickly).  
This assumption can be relaxed using cost and schedule modeling and Monte 
Carlo simulation methods. In terms of the options valuation, the option to defer for 
the Navy follows cost comparisons. In other words, it reduces the cost exposure for 
the second MK41 from $110.10 million to an expected cost of $69.89 million. In 
addition, decision-makers observe in the options strategy tree and decision tree 
where they can keep the option to defer open and under what conditions the Navy 
should execute and invest in the second MK41. One likely extension is where the 
decision-maker can introduce probabilities or expectations of Navy actions (new 
missions and new requirements) or events (wartime, peacetime). This affects the 
flexibility of the second MK41 by constraining the option’s flexibility to defer. For 
instance, if the Navy has strong expectations of requiring the second MK1 (wartime 
probability is higher than 30%), it reduces the value of the option to defer and 
accelerates the availability and execution of the second MK41 option earlier. In 
peacetime, the Navy has more flexibility in terms of how it implements or assesses 
its real options to wait and defer. 
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Figure 8: Options Framing on Vertical Launch Systems 
Step 2: Cost Analysis and Data Gathering  
Once the various FASO/MASO options are framed and modeled, as shown in 
the previous step, the modeling process continues with additional data gathering 
activities. Figure 9 shows some examples of shadow revenues (i.e., cost savings 
from lowered cost of future upgrades and technology insertions; costs mitigated by 
reducing the need for alternative equipment and lower spare parts; and other costs 
deferred by reducing the need for maintenance and operating costs) or cost savings, 
additional direct and indirect costs of implementing the new option, and capital 
requirements. 
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Figure 9: Financial Economic Cost Savings and Aversion Cash Flow Model 
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Step 3: Financial Modeling 
The Discounted Cash Flow section, shown in Figure 8, is at the heart of the 
input assumptions for the analysis. Analysts would enter their input assumptions—
such as starting and ending years of the analysis, the discount rate to use, and the 
marginal tax rate—and set up the project economics model (adding or deleting rows 
in each subcategory of the financial model). Additional time-series inputs are entered 
in the data grid as required, while some elements of this grid are intermediate 
computed values.  
Analysts can also identify and create the various options, and compute the 
economic and financial results such as net present value (NPV), internal rate of 
return (IRR), modified internal rate of return (MIRR), profitability index (PI), return on 
investment (ROI), payback period (PP), and discounted payback period (DPP). This 
is shown in Figures 9 and 10, complete with various charts, cash flow ratios and 
models, intermediate calculations, and comparisons of the options within a portfolio 
view, as illustrated in the figure. As a side note, the term Option is used to represent 
a generic analysis option, where each project can be a different asset, project, 
acquisition, investment, research and development, or simply variations of the same 
investment (e.g., different financing methods when acquiring the same firm, different 
market conditions and outcomes, or different scenarios or implementation paths). 
Therefore, the more flexible terminology of Project is adopted instead. 
Figure 11 illustrates the Economic Results of each project. This figure shows 
the results from the chosen project and returns the NPV, IRR, MIRR, PI, ROI, PP, 
and DPP. These computed results are based on the analyst’s selection of the 
discounting convention, if there is a constant terminal growth rate, and the cash flow 
to use (e.g., net cash flow versus net income or operating cash flow). An NPV Profile 
table and chart are also provided in the figure, where different discount rates and 
their respective NPV results are shown and charted.  
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Figure 10: Financial and Economic Ratios and Performance Measurements
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Figure 11: Financial and Economic Results  
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The Economic Results shown are for each individual project, whereas the 
Portfolio Analysis (see Figure 12) compares the economic results of all projects at 
once. The Terminal Value Annualized Growth Rate is applied to the last year’s cash 
flow to account for a perpetual constant growth rate cash flow model, and these 
future cash flows, depending on the cash flow type chosen, are discounted back to 
the base year and added to the NPV to arrive at the perpetual valuation. 
Static Portfolio Analysis and Comparisons of Multiple Projects 
Figure 12 illustrates the Portfolio Analysis of multiple Projects. This Portfolio 
Analysis returns the computed economic and financial indicators such as NPV, IRR, 
MIRR, PI, ROI, PP, and DPP for all the projects combined into a portfolio view 
(these results can be stand-alone with no base case or computed as incremental 
values above and beyond the chosen base case). The Economic Results show the 
individual project’s economic and financial indicators, whereas this Level 2 Portfolio 
Analysis view shows the results of all projects’ indicators and compares them side 
by side. There are also two charts available for comparing these individual projects’ 
results. The Portfolio Analysis is used to obtain a side-by-side comparison of all the 
main economic and financial indicators of all the projects at once. For instance, 
analysts can compare all the NPVs from each project in a single results grid. The 
bubble chart on the left provides a visual representation of up to three chosen 
variables at once (e.g., the y-axis shows the IRR, the x-axis represents the NPV, 
and the size of the bubble may represent the capital investment; in such a situation, 
one would prefer a smaller bubble that is in the top right quadrant of the chart). 
These charts have associated icons that can be used to modify their settings (chart 
type, color, legend, etc.).  
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Figure 12: Static Portfolio Analysis 
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Step 4: Tornado and Sensitivity Analytics 
Figure 13 illustrates the Applied Analytics results, which allows analysts to run 
Tornado Analysis and Scenario Analysis on any one of the projects previously 
modeled––the analytics cover all the various projects and options. We can, 
therefore, run tornado or scenario analyses on any one of the projects or options. 
Tornado analysis is a static sensitivity analysis of the selected model’s output to 
each input assumption, performed one at a time, and ranked from most impactful to 
least impactful. We can start the analysis by first choosing the output variable to test.  
We used the default sensitivity settings of ±10% on each input assumption to 
test and decide how many input variables to chart (large models with many inputs 
may generate unsightly and less useful charts, whereas showing just the top 
variables reveals more information through a more elegant chart). Analysts can also 
choose to run the input assumptions as unique inputs, group them as a line item (all 
individual inputs on a single line item are assumed to be one variable), or run as 
variable groups (e.g., all line items under Revenue will be assumed to be a single 
variable). Analysts will need to remember to click Update to run the analysis if they 
make any changes to any of the settings. The sensitivity run was based on the input 
assumptions as unique inputs, but the inputs can also be grouped as a line item (all 
individual inputs on a single line item are assumed to be one variable), or the 
analysis can be run as variable groups (e.g., all line items under Revenue will be 
assumed to be a single variable). The following summarizes the tornado analysis 
chart’s main characteristics: 
 Each horizontal bar indicates a unique input assumption that constitutes a 
precedent to the selected output variable.  
 The x-axis represents the values of the selected output variable. The 
wider the bar chart, the greater the impact/swing the input assumption has 
on the output.  
 A green bar on the right indicates that the input assumption has a positive 
effect on the selected output (conversely, a red bar on the right indicates a 
negative effect).  
 Each of the precedent or input assumptions that directly affect the NPV 
with Terminal Value is tested ±10% by default (this setting can be 
changed); the top 10 variables are shown on the chart by default (this 
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setting can be changed), with a 2-decimal precision setting; and each 
unique input is tested individually. 
 The default sensitivity is globally ±10% of each input variable, but each of 
these inputs can be individually modified in the data grid. Note that a 
larger percentage variation will test for nonlinear effects as well. 
 The model’s granularity can be set (e.g., Variable Groups look at an entire 
variable group such as all revenues or direct costs and will be modified at 
once; Line Items change the entire row for multiple years at once; and 
Individual Unique Inputs look at modifying each input cell). 
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Figure 13: Applied Analytics—Tornado Analysis
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Figure 14 illustrates the Scenario Analysis results, where the scenario 
analysis can be easily performed through a two-step process: Identify the model 
input settings and run the model to obtain scenario output tables. In the Scenario 
Input settings, analysts start by selecting the output variable they wish to test from 
the droplist. Then, based on the selection, the precedents of the output will be listed 
under two categories (Line Item, which will change all input assumptions in the entire 
line item in the model simultaneously, and Single Item, which will change individual 
input assumption items). Analysts select one or two checkboxes at a time and the 
inputs they wish to run scenarios on and enter the plus/minus percentage and the 
number of steps between these two values to test. Analysts can also add color 
coding of sweetspots or hotspots in the scenario analysis (values falling within 
different ranges have unique colors). Analysts can create multiple scenarios and 
Save As each one (enter a name and model notes for each saved scenario).  
Scenario analysis results can sometimes be used as heat maps to identify the 
combinations of input parameter conditions whereby the calculated outputs will be 
above or below certain thresholds. A visual heat map can be created by adding color 
thresholds in the scenario results table. 
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Figure 14: Applied Analytics—Scenario Analysis Input 
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Figure 15 illustrates the Scenario Output Tables to run the saved Scenario 
Analysis models. Analysts click on the droplist to select the previously saved 
scenarios to Update and run. The selected scenario table complete with 
sweetspot/hotspot color coding will be generated. Decimals can be increased or 
decreased as required, and analysts can Copy Grid or View Full Grid as needed. 
The following are some notes on using the scenario analysis methodology: 
 Create and run scenario analysis on either one or two input variables at 
once.  
 The scenario settings can be saved for retrieval in the future, which means 
analysts can modify any input assumptions in the options models and 
come back to rerun the saved scenarios. 
 Increase/decrease decimals in the scenario results tables, as well as 
change colors in the tables for easier visual interpretation (especially when 
trying to identify scenario combinations, or so-called sweetspots and 
hotspots). 
 Additional input variables are available by scrolling down the form. 
 Line Items can be changed using ±X% where all inputs in the line are 
changed multiple times within this specific range all at once. Individual 
Items can be changed ±Y units where each input is changed multiple 
times within this specific range. 
 Sweetspots and hotspots refer to specific combinations of two input 
variables that will drive the output up or down. For instance, suppose 
investments are below a certain threshold and revenues are above a 
certain barrier. The NPV will then be in excess of the expected budget (the 
sweetspots, perhaps highlighted in green). Or if investments are above a 
certain value, NPV will turn negative if revenues fall below a certain 
threshold (the hotspots, perhaps highlighted in red). 
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Figure 15: Applied Analytics—Scenario Tables 
20.00% 21.00% 22.00% 23.00% 24.00% 25.00% 26.00% 27.00% 28.00% 29.00% 30.00% 31.00% 32.00% 33.00% 34.00% 35.00% 36.00% 37.00% 38.00%
3,718,366.00 132,576.00 110,413.00 90,269.00 71,903.00 55,105.00 39,697.00 25,526.00 12,458.00 376.90 -10,818.00 -21,215.00 -30,891.00 -39,916.00 -48,348.00 -56,241.00 -63,642.00 -70,595.00 -77,135.00 -83,297.00
3,737,936.00 134,780.00 112,499.00 92,248.00 73,782.00 56,894.00 41,403.00 27,154.00 14,015.00 1,867.60 -9,388.80 -19,843.00 -29,573.00 -38,647.00 -47,126.00 -55,063.00 -62,507.00 -69,498.00 -76,075.00 -82,272.00
3,757,507.00 136,985.00 114,585.00 94,226.00 75,662.00 58,683.00 43,108.00 28,783.00 15,572.00 3,358.40 -7,959.50 -18,471.00 -28,255.00 -37,379.00 -45,905.00 -53,886.00 -61,371.00 -68,401.00 -75,015.00 -81,246.00
3,777,077.00 139,190.00 116,672.00 96,205.00 77,541.00 60,471.00 44,813.00 30,411.00 17,129.00 4,849.10 -6,530.30 -17,099.00 -26,936.00 -36,111.00 -44,683.00 -52,709.00 -60,235.00 -67,304.00 -73,954.00 -80,221.00
3,796,647.00 141,394.00 118,758.00 98,183.00 79,421.00 62,260.00 46,519.00 32,039.00 18,686.00 6,339.80 -5,101.10 -15,727.00 -25,618.00 -34,842.00 -43,462.00 -51,531.00 -59,099.00 -66,207.00 -72,894.00 -79,195.00
3,816,218.00 143,599.00 120,844.00 100,161.00 81,300.00 64,049.00 48,224.00 33,667.00 20,242.00 7,830.50 -3,671.90 -14,355.00 -24,299.00 -33,574.00 -42,241.00 -50,354.00 -57,963.00 -65,110.00 -71,834.00 -78,170.00
3,835,788.00 145,804.00 122,931.00 102,140.00 83,180.00 65,838.00 49,929.00 35,296.00 21,799.00 9,321.30 -2,242.70 -12,984.00 -22,981.00 -32,306.00 -41,019.00 -49,177.00 -56,827.00 -64,013.00 -70,774.00 -77,145.00
3,855,358.00 148,008.00 125,017.00 104,118.00 85,059.00 67,627.00 51,635.00 36,924.00 23,356.00 10,812.00 -813.48 -11,612.00 -21,663.00 -31,037.00 -39,798.00 -47,999.00 -55,691.00 -62,916.00 -69,714.00 -76,119.00
3,874,929.00 150,213.00 127,103.00 106,096.00 86,939.00 69,415.00 53,340.00 38,552.00 24,913.00 12,303.00 615.74 -10,240.00 -20,344.00 -29,769.00 -38,576.00 -46,822.00 -54,555.00 -61,819.00 -68,654.00 -75,094.00
3,894,499.00 152,418.00 129,190.00 108,075.00 88,818.00 71,204.00 55,045.00 40,180.00 26,470.00 13,793.00 2,045.00 -8,867.80 -19,026.00 -28,501.00 -37,355.00 -45,644.00 -53,419.00 -60,722.00 -67,594.00 -74,068.00
3,914,069.00 154,622.00 131,276.00 110,053.00 90,698.00 72,993.00 56,750.00 41,808.00 28,027.00 15,284.00 3,474.20 -7,495.90 -17,708.00 -27,232.00 -36,133.00 -44,467.00 -52,283.00 -59,625.00 -66,533.00 -73,043.00
3,933,640.00 156,827.00 133,362.00 112,031.00 92,578.00 74,782.00 58,456.00 43,437.00 29,584.00 16,775.00 4,903.40 -6,124.00 -16,389.00 -25,964.00 -34,912.00 -43,290.00 -51,147.00 -58,528.00 -65,473.00 -72,018.00
3,953,210.00 159,032.00 135,449.00 114,010.00 94,457.00 76,571.00 60,161.00 45,065.00 31,141.00 18,266.00 6,332.60 -4,752.10 -15,071.00 -24,696.00 -33,691.00 -42,112.00 -50,011.00 -57,431.00 -64,413.00 -70,992.00
3,972,780.00 161,236.00 137,535.00 115,988.00 96,337.00 78,359.00 61,866.00 46,693.00 32,698.00 19,756.00 7,761.80 -3,380.20 -13,752.00 -23,427.00 -32,469.00 -40,935.00 -48,875.00 -56,334.00 -63,353.00 -69,967.00
3,992,351.00 163,441.00 139,621.00 117,966.00 98,216.00 80,148.00 63,572.00 48,321.00 34,254.00 21,247.00 9,191.00 -2,008.30 -12,434.00 -22,159.00 -31,248.00 -39,758.00 -47,739.00 -55,237.00 -62,293.00 -68,942.00
4,011,921.00 165,646.00 141,708.00 119,945.00 100,096.00 81,937.00 65,277.00 49,950.00 35,811.00 22,738.00 10,620.00 -636.44 -11,116.00 -20,891.00 -30,026.00 -38,580.00 -46,603.00 -54,140.00 -61,233.00 -67,916.00
4,031,491.00 167,850.00 143,794.00 121,923.00 101,975.00 83,726.00 66,982.00 51,578.00 37,368.00 24,229.00 12,049.00 735.46 -9,797.20 -19,622.00 -28,805.00 -37,403.00 -45,467.00 -53,043.00 -60,173.00 -66,891.00
4,051,062.00 170,055.00 145,880.00 123,901.00 103,855.00 85,515.00 68,688.00 53,206.00 38,925.00 25,719.00 13,479.00 2,107.40 -8,478.80 -18,354.00 -27,584.00 -36,225.00 -44,331.00 -51,947.00 -59,112.00 -65,865.00
4,070,632.00 172,260.00 147,967.00 125,880.00 105,734.00 87,304.00 70,393.00 54,834.00 40,482.00 27,210.00 14,908.00 3,479.30 -7,160.40 -17,086.00 -26,362.00 -35,048.00 -43,195.00 -50,850.00 -58,052.00 -64,840.00
4,090,203.00 174,464.00 150,053.00 127,858.00 107,614.00 89,092.00 72,098.00 56,462.00 42,039.00 28,701.00 16,337.00 4,851.20 -5,842.00 -15,817.00 -25,141.00 -33,871.00 -42,059.00 -49,753.00 -56,992.00 -63,815.00
4,109,773.00 176,669.00 152,139.00 129,836.00 109,493.00 90,881.00 73,803.00 58,091.00 43,596.00 30,191.00 17,766.00 6,223.10 -4,523.60 -14,549.00 -23,919.00 -32,693.00 -40,923.00 -48,656.00 -55,932.00 -62,789.00
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Step 5: Monte Carlo Risk Simulation 
Figure 16 illustrates the Risk Simulation analysis, where Monte Carlo risk 
simulations can be set up and run. Analysts can set up probability distribution 
assumptions on any combinations of inputs, run a risk simulation tens to hundreds of 
thousands of trials, and retrieve the simulated forecast outputs as charts, statistics, 
probabilities, and confidence intervals to develop comprehensive risk profiles of the 
projects.  
 
Figure 16: Monte Carlo Risk Simulation Input Assumptions 
 
Simulation Results, Confidence Intervals, and Probabilities 
Figure 17 illustrates the Risk Simulation results. The simulation forecast chart 
is shown on the right, while percentiles and simulation statistics are presented on the 
left.  
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Figure 17: Monte Carlo Risk Simulation Results 
 
Probability Distribution Overlay Charts  
Figure 18 illustrates the Overlay Results. Multiple simulation output variables 
can be compared at once using the overlay charts. Analysts simply check/uncheck 
the simulated outputs they wish to compare and select the chart type to show (e.g., 
S-Curves, CDF, PDF). Analysts can also add percentile or certainty lines by first 
selecting the output chart, then entering the relevant values, and finally clicking the 
Update button. The generated charts are highly flexible in that analysts can modify 
them using the included chart icons (as well as whether to show or hide gridlines), 
and the chart can be copied into the Microsoft Windows clipboard for pasting into 
another software application. Typically, S-curves or CDF curves are used in overlay 
analysis when comparing the risk profile of multiple simulated forecast results.  
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Figure 18: Simulated Overlay Results 
Analysis of Alternatives and Dynamic Sensitivity Analysis  
Figure 19 illustrates the Analysis of Alternatives results. Whereas the Overlay 
Results shows the simulated results as charts (PDF/CDF), the Analysis of 
Alternatives shows the results of the simulation statistics in a table format as well as 
a chart of the statistics such that one project can be compared against another. The 
standard approach is to run an analysis of alternatives to compare one project to 
another, but analysts can also choose to analyze the results on an Incremental 
Analysis basis. 
Figure 20 illustrates the Dynamic Sensitivity Analysis computations. Tornado 
analysis and scenario analysis are both static calculations. Dynamic sensitivity, in 
contrast, is a dynamic analysis, which can be performed only after a simulation is 
run. Analysts start by selecting the desired project’s economic output. Red bars on 
the Rank Correlation chart indicate negative correlations, and green bars indicate 
positive correlations for the left chart. The correlations’ absolute values are used to 
rank the variables with the highest relationship to the lowest, for all simulation input 
assumptions. The Contribution to Variance computations and chart indicate the 
percentage fluctuation in the output variable that can be statistically explained by the 
fluctuations in each of the input variables.  
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Figure 19: Simulated Analysis of Alternatives 
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Figure 20: Simulated Dynamic Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Step 6: Strategic Real Options Valuation Modeling 
Figure 21 illustrates the Options Strategies tab. Options Strategies is where 
analysts can draw their own custom strategic maps, and each map can have 
multiple strategic real options paths. This analysis allows analysts to draw and 
visualize these strategic pathways and does not perform any computations. The 
examples in Figures 7 and 8 can be easily incorporated into the strategy tree seen in 
Figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Framing Flexibility and Options Strategies 
 
Real Options Valuation Modeling 
Figure 22 illustrates the Options Valuation and the Strategy View. This part of 
the analysis performs the calculations of real options valuation models. Analysts 
must understand the basic concepts of real options before proceeding. This analysis 
internalizes the more sophisticated Real Options SLS software (see Chapter 13 of 
Mun’s Modeling Risk book [2015]). Instead of requiring more advanced knowledge 
of real options analysis and modeling, analysts can simply choose the real option 
types, and the required inputs will be displayed for entry. Analysts can compute and 
obtain the real options value quickly and efficiently, as well as run the subsequent 
tornado, sensitivity, and scenario analyses.  
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 99 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 22: Value of Flexibility Options 
 
The strategic real options analysis is solved by employing various 
methodologies, including the use of binomial lattices with a market-replicating 
portfolios approach, and backed up using modified closed-form sequential 
compound option models. The value of a compound option is based on the value of 
another option. That is, the underlying variable for the compound option is another 
option, and the compound option can be either sequential in nature or simultaneous. 
Solving such a model requires programming capabilities. This subsection is meant 
as a quick peek into the math underlying a very basic closed-form compound option. 
It is only a preview of the detailed modeling techniques used in the current analysis 
and should not be assumed to be the final word. For instance, as suggested in Mun 
(2016), we first start by solving for the critical value of I, an iterative component in 
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Then, solve recursively for the value from the previous equation and input it 
into the model: 
 
The model is then applied to a sequential problem where future phase options 
depend on previous phase options (e.g., Phase II depends on Phase I’s successful 
implementation). 
Definitions of Variables 
S   present value of future cash flows ($) 
r   risk-free rate (%) 
   volatility (%) 
   cumulative standard-normal  
q   continuous dividend payout (%)  
I   critical value solved recursively 
   cumulative bivariate-normal  
X1   strike for the underlying ($) 
X2   strike for the option on the option ($) 
t1   expiration date for the option on the option  
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The preceding closed-form differential equation models are then verified 
using the risk-neutral market-replicating portfolio approach assuming a sequential 
compound option. In solving the market-replicating approach, we use the following 
functional forms, noted in Mun (2016): 
 Hedge ratio (h):  
 
 Debt load (D):  
 
 Call value (C) at node i:  
 
 Risk-adjusted probability (q):  
 
obtained assuming  
  
 This means that  
 and  ,  
so we get  
Additional methods using closed-form solutions, binomial and trinomial 
lattices, and simulation approaches, as well as dynamic simulated decision trees are 
used in computing the relevant option values of each strategic pathway as 
previously indicated. Fortunately, Navy analysts do not have to be experts in 
advanced mathematics to run these models, as they have all been preprogrammed 
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Step 7: Portfolio Optimization 
Figure 23 illustrates the Portfolio Optimization’s Optimization settings. In the 
Portfolio Optimization section, the individual projects can be modeled as a portfolio 
and optimized to determine the best combination of projects for the portfolio. In 
today’s competitive global economy, companies are faced with many difficult 
decisions. These decisions include allocating financial resources, building or 
expanding facilities, managing inventories, and determining product-mix strategies. 
Such decisions might involve thousands or millions of potential alternatives. 
Considering and evaluating each of them would be impractical and maybe even 
impossible.  
A model can provide valuable assistance in incorporating relevant variables 
when analyzing decisions and in finding the best solutions for making decisions. 
Models capture the most important features of a problem and present them in a form 
that is easy to interpret. Models often provide insights that intuition alone cannot. An 
optimization model has three major elements: decision variables, constraints, and an 
objective. In short, the optimization methodology finds the best combination or 
permutation of decision variables (e.g., which products to sell or which projects to 
execute) in every conceivable way such that the objective is maximized (e.g., 
revenues and net income) or minimized (e.g., risk and costs) while still satisfying the 
constraints (e.g., budget and resources). 
The projects can be modeled within the ROV software as a portfolio and 
optimized to determine the best combination of projects for the portfolio in the 
Optimization Settings subtab. Analysts start by selecting the optimization method 
(Static or Dynamic Optimization). Then they select the decision variable type of 
Discrete Binary (choose which Project or Options to execute with a Go/No-Go Binary 
1/0 decision) or Continuous Budget Allocation (returns % of budget to allocate to 
each option or project as long as the total portfolio is 100%); select the Objective 
(Max NPV, Min Risk, etc.); set up any Constraints (e.g., budget restrictions, number 
of projects restrictions, or create customized restrictions); select the options or 
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projects to optimize/allocate/choose (default selection is all options); and when 
completed, run the Optimization.  
 
Optimization (Budgets and Projects) 
 - Number of Projects ≤ 7 
 - Total Capital Investment ≤ $3,500,000 
 - Maximize Economic Value (e.g., NPV, IRR, ROI) 
 
Optimization (Budgets and Projects) 
 - Number of Projects ≤ 7 
 - Total Capital Investment ≤ $3,500,000 
 - Maximize Economic Value (e.g., NPV, IRR, ROI) 
 
Minimizing Cost while Maximizing Value and Minimizing Risk 
Maximizing OPNAV value 
Maximizing KVA value 
Maximizing Command value 
Maximizing a Weighted Average of all Objectives 
 
Figure 23: Sample Portfolio Optimization Parameters 
Figure 24 illustrates the Optimization Results, which returns the results from 
the portfolio optimization analysis. The main results are provided in the data grid, 
showing the final Objective Function results, final Optimized Constraints, and the 
allocation, selection, or optimization across all individual options or projects within 
this optimized portfolio. The top portion of the figure shows the textual details and 
results of the optimization algorithms applied, and the chart illustrates the final 
objective function. The chart will only show a single point for regular optimizations, 
whereas it will return an investment efficient frontier curve if the optional Efficient 
Frontier settings are set (min, max, step size).  
Figures 24 and 25 provide examples of the critical results for decision-makers 
as they allow flexibility in designing their own portfolio of options. For instance, 
Figure 24 shows an efficient frontier of portfolios, where each of the points along the 
curve represents an optimized portfolio subject to a certain set of constraints. In this 
example, the constraints were the number of options that can be selected in a ship, 
and the total cost of obtaining these options is subject to a budget constraint. The 
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colored columns on the right in Figure 24 show the various combinations of budget 
limits and maximum number of options allowed. For instance, if a program office in 
the Navy allocates only $2.5 million (see the Frontier Variable located on the second 
row) and no more than four options per ship, then only options 3, 7, 9, and 10 are 
feasible, and this portfolio combination would generate the biggest bang for the buck 
while simultaneously satisfying the budgetary and number of options constraints. If 
the constraints were relaxed to, say, five options and a $3.5 million budget, then 
option 5 is added to the mix. Finally, at $4.5 million and no more than seven options 
per ship, options 1 and 2 should be added to the mix. Interestingly, even with a 
higher budget of $5.5 million, the same portfolio of options is selected. In fact, the 
Optimized Constraint 2 shows that only $4.1 million is used. Therefore, as a 
decision-making tool for the budget-setting officials, the maximum budget that 
should be set for this portfolio of options should be $4.1 million. Similarly, the 
decision-maker can move backwards, where, say, if the original budget of $4.5 
million were slashed by the U.S. Congress to $3.5 million, then the options that 
should be eliminated are options 1 and 2.  
While Figure 24 shows the efficient frontier where the constraints such as 
number of options allowed and budget were varied to determine the efficient portfolio 
selection, Figure 25 shows multiple portfolios with different objectives. For instance, 
the five models shown were to maximize the financial bang for the buck (minimizing 
cost and maximizing value while simultaneously minimizing risk), maximizing 
OPNAV value, maximizing KVA value, maximizing Command value, and maximizing 
a Weighted Average of all objectives. This capability is important because 
depending on who is doing the analysis, their objectives and decisions will differ 
based on different perspectives. Using a multiple criteria optimization approach 
allows us to see the scoring from all perspectives. Options with the highest count 
(e.g., 5) would receive the highest priority in the final portfolio, as it satisfies all 
stakeholders’ perspectives, and would, hence, be considered first, followed by 
options with counts of 4, 3, 2, and 1.  
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Figure 24: Portfolio Optimization Results 
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Figure 25: Multi-Criteria Portfolio Optimization Results 
 
As a side note, and for the purposes of being comprehensive and inclusive, 
we point out that multiple types of algorithms have been developed over the years to 
find the solutions of an optimization problem, from basic linear optimization using the 
simplex model and solving first partial differential equations. However, when more 
and more complex real-life problems are assumed, these basic methods tend to 
break down and more advanced algorithms are required. In solving our efficient 
frontier problem, we utilized a combination of genetic algorithm, Lagrange 
multipliers, and taboo-based reduced gradient search methodologies.  
Simplistically, the Lagrange multiplier solution assumes some nonlinear 
problem of 
min 𝑜𝑟 max 𝑓(𝑥)  
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑔𝑖(𝑥) =  𝑏𝑖  ∀ 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚 
where the equality is oftentimes replaced by some inequality values indicating a 
ceiling or floor constraint.  
From this functional form, we first derive the Lagrange multiplier v for all i 
values: 




𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑔𝑖(𝑥) = 𝑏1, … , 𝑔𝑚(𝑥) = 𝑏𝑚 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 107 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 














∗) = 𝑏𝑖  
This approach is simple and elegant but limited to linear and quasi-linear, as 
well as some simple nonlinear functional forms of f(x). To be able to extend the 
functional form to generalized nonlinear applications, we need to add conditions to 
the solution set and apply some search algorithms to cover a large (and oftentimes 
unlimited set of optimal allocations). One limitation is the requirement that the Kuhn-
Tucker condition is satisfied where the nonlinear problems have a differentiable 
general form: 
min 𝑜𝑟 max 𝑓(𝑥) 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑔𝑖(𝑥) ≥  𝑏𝑖  ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑡 
     𝑔𝑖(𝑥) ≤  𝑏𝑖 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑡 
     𝑔𝑖(𝑥) =  𝑏𝑖 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑡 
and the inequality constraints will need to be active at a local optimum or when the 
Lagrange variable is set to null: 
𝑣𝑖[𝑏𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖(𝑥)] = 0 
In addition, mathematical algorithms will have to be developed to perform 
both an ad hoc and systematic search of the optimal solution set. Using an 
enumeration method will take even a supercomputer close to an infinite number of 
years to delineate all possible permutations. Therefore, search algorithms are 
typically used in generating an efficient frontier using optimization. One simple 
approach is the use of a reduced gradient search method. To summarize the 
approach, we assume 
∇𝑓(𝑥) ∙ ∆𝑥 
where the functional form f(x) is the objective function and is divided into two parts, a 
basic (B) and non-basic portion (N) that is multiplied by the change in vector 
direction x. Using a Taylor expansion, we obtain 
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∇𝑓(𝑥) ∙ ∆𝑥 = ∇𝑓(𝑥)𝐵 ∙ ∆𝑥𝐵 + ∇𝑓(𝑥)𝑁 ∙ ∆𝑥𝑁 
= ∇𝑓(𝑥)𝐵 ∙ (−𝐵−1𝑁∆𝑥𝑁) + ∇𝑓(𝑥)𝑁 ∙ ∆𝑥𝑁 
= (∇𝑓(𝑥)𝑁 − ∇𝑓(𝑥)𝐵𝐵−1𝑁)∆𝑥𝑁 
  
The reduced gradient with respect to the solution matrix B is 
𝑟 ≜ (𝑟𝐵 , 𝑟𝑁) 
where 
𝑟𝐵 ≜ 0 
𝑟𝑁 ≜ ∇𝑓(𝑥)𝑁 − ∇𝑓(𝑥)𝐵𝐵−1𝑁 
Solving for this solution set is manually possible when the number of decision 
variables is small (typically fewer than four or five), but once the number of decision 
variables is large, as in all real-life situations, the manual solution is intractable and 
computer search algorithms have to be employed. The general method employed 
includes taking the following steps: 
1. Estimate the starting point and obtain the basis matrix set.  
2. Compute sample test points and obtain the reduced gradient vector 
direction. 
3. Test for constraint feasibilities at the limits. 
4. Solve for the Lagrange optimal set. 
5. Start on a new set of points. 
6. Change the basis set if a better set of points is obtained or stop 
optimization. 
7. Repeat iteration and advance or stop when tolerance level is achieved.  
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VII. Conclusions and Recommendations  
A. Key Conclusions and Next Steps 
Strategic real options valuation (ROV) provides the decision-maker the right, 
but not the obligation, to hold off on executing a certain decision until a later time 
when uncertainties are resolved and when better information is available. The option 
implies that flexibility to execute a certain path exists and was predetermined or 
predesigned in advance. Based on the research performed thus far, we conclude 
that the methodology has significant merits and is worthy of more detailed follow-on 
analysis. It is therefore recommended that the ROV methodology be applied on a 
real case facing the Navy with actual data, and the project’s outcomes tracked over 
time.  
B. Recommendations on Implementing Real Options Analysis 
First, it is vital to understand that real options analysis is not a simple set of 
equations or models. It is an entire decision-making process that enhances the 
traditional decision analysis approaches. It takes what has been tried-and-true 
financial analytics and evolves it to the next step by pushing the envelope of 
analytical techniques. Second, it is vital to understand that 50% of the value in real 
options analysis is simply thinking about it. Another 25% of the value comes from the 
calculating activities, while the final 25% comes from the results interpretation and 
explanation to management. Several issues should be considered when attempting 
to implement real options analysis: 
 Tools––Using the correct tools is important. These tools must be more 
comprehensive than initially required because analysts will grow into them 
over time. Do not be restrictive in choosing the relevant tools. Always 
provide room for expansion. Advanced tools will relieve the analyst of 
detailed model building and let him or her focus instead on 75% of the 
value––thinking about the problem and interpreting the results.  
 Resources––The best tools in the world are useless without the relevant 
human resources to back them up. Tools do not eliminate the analyst but 
enhance the analyst’s ability to effectively and efficiently execute the 
analysis. The right people with the right tools will go a long way. Because 
there are only a few real options experts in the world, who truly 
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understand the complex theoretical underpinnings of the models as well 
the practical applications, it follows that care should be taken in choosing 
the correct team. A team of competent real options users is vital in the 
success of the initiative. The Navy should consider building a team of in-
house experts to implement real options analysis and to maintain the 
ability for continuity, training, and knowledge transfer over time. 
Knowledge and experience in the theories, implementation, training, and 
consulting are the core requirements of this initial team of individuals. This 
is why training is vital for the core Navy real options analysts’ team. For 
instance, the CRM/CQRM certification program provides analysts and 
managers with the opportunity to immerse themselves into the theoretical 
and real-life applications of simulation, forecasting, optimization, and real 
options.  
 Senior Decision-Maker Buy-In––The analysis buy-in must be top-down 
where Navy senior management drives the real options analysis initiative. 
A bottom-up approach where a few inexperienced junior analysts try to 
impress the powers that be will fail. Someone in Navy leadership should 
be the champion of the move to incorporate real options analysis within 
the acquisitions business case development.  
 
Modeling and analytics are clearly a hard and sometimes dry and difficult 
subject, and this research is meant to make some of the basic concepts clearer and 
simpler to understand. One goal of this current research is knowledge transmission. 
So, what now? Below are some ideas on how the concepts of options modeling and 
flexibility options can be implemented at the DoD based on the researcher’s 
experience and perspectives (see Mun, 2015, for more details): 
 Practice Makes Perfect. This adage is true of almost everything in life. 
Make sure you understand the theory and practice of these risk analysis 
methods. You really do not want to demonstrate the software, 
methodology, and applications and be questioned beyond your ability to 
answer intelligently. Be well-versed and be well-prepared before you 
broach this topic at work.  
 Low Hanging Fruits. The proverbial advice to “not bite off more than you 
can chew” is apropos here. Do not hit the ground running by analyzing the 
highest priority, largest, and most cumbersome project in the entire 
company. Do so only if you are truly well-trained and well-versed in all of 
the risk concepts. Rather, look for some low-hanging fruits: projects that 
are simple to tackle and less convoluted, having clear risks, clear portfolio 
optimization requirements, sufficient data to run distributional fitting on, 
well-behaved to run forecast approaches on, very clear strategic options, 
and so forth.  
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 Executive Summary. Using the low-hanging fruits approach, create a 
two-page (i.e., use a single sheet of paper, both sides) executive 
summary—executives are very busy or get distracted easily, while some 
just fear learning new things, and when reviewing technical stuff they do 
not really understand, have the attention span of a two-year-old. Start with 
the basics such as an introduction to the problem being solved, some 
simple traditional single-point analysis, and then jump into basic risk 
analysis methodologies such as a tornado analysis (it is easy enough to 
run and to describe), a scenario analysis table, perhaps a few three-point 
high-medium-low triangular distributions (clearly avoid the beta, gamma, 
or hypergeometric world for now). Then run a simulation and show the 
forecast chart, with some basic things such as probability of exceeding a 
certain value, or worst-case scenario Value at Risk, and so forth. You get 
the idea. By following this approach, you slowly but concretely show the 
applicability of risk analysis using the company’s own projects and 
terminology. This sort of a summary will go a long way. Do several of 
these, and preferably across different divisions and departments, showing 
that these methods are not confined or limited to the finance and strategy 
department, but are also applicable to the quality control Six Sigma guys 
down the hall, to marketing strategy and pricing, to research and 
development, and so forth.  
 Senior Level Buy-In: Elevator Pitch and Keep It Simple, Stupid. You get 
the idea. Create your own elevator pitch. This is vital for success of any 
Integrated Risk Management implementation within a firm, as without 
senior management support, this effort will not take root and will fail before 
it even starts. 
 Knowledge Is Power. And just like riding a bicycle, practice makes 
perfect. Take courses, seminars, and training classes on quantitative risk 
analysis and real options modeling.  
 A Three-Pronged Effort. Analysts need to be trained with the 
methodology and accoutered with the relevant software and tools to help 
implement these real options and risk analytics techniques. Middle 
management needs to understand the fundamentals in order to be 
effective middle-men between the analysts and senior leadership. Finally, 
and most importantly, you need buy-in and sponsorship from senior 
management; otherwise the methodologies will never be implemented. 
 Implementation of Case Studies. Show that real options analysis is 
practical and applicable in strategic decisions, and that real options 
analysis is not only applicable in financial and economics of a DoD 
program, or to battlefield strategy, or the new technology and weapons 
R&D, and so forth, but permeates all facets of the DoD. Creating quick 
executive summary cases––several short two-page case studies within 
different functions and divisions of the organization––even with high-level 
estimates, will show senior military leadership and staff the applicability of 
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real options and risk analysis within your organization. This is because by 
using the same project names, terminologies, and lingo used in your 
organization, these cases become directly applicable––this psychological 
barrier needs to be breached. The caveat that needs to be properly 
addressed is that the figures used are only for illustrative purposes and 
more detailed analyses are required for more exact valuations. Finally, a 
traditional analysis needs to be presented side by side in comparison with 
the more advanced real options and risk analytics in order to showcase 
the value-added propositions of these new methodologies.  
 Staff and Leadership Education. Both senior leadership and analysts 
need to understand the fundamental concepts of real options and risk 
analysis and that real options analysis is not a scary academic exercise 
but can be very real and practical.  
 Evidence Showing Low Implementation Cost and Minimal Learning 
Curve. This aspect is important because methodologies that take a 
substantial amount of time, money, and other resources will be quickly 
dismissed as too costly to implement. The returns on investment are 
enormous. Even more vital is considering what it will cost the organization 
if wrong decisions are being made because of not looking at the right 
valuation and decision analysis approach. 
 Senior Management’s High-Level Training. Senior leadership needs to 
be trained in at least a half-day session in terms of understanding the key 
elements of risk management, how it works within organizations, and what 
it can do, and to explore multiple business cases at various multinational 
organizations, both successes and failures. The outcome of this training is 
the ability to quickly identify what projects might be a best fit for these 
types of advanced risk management techniques, as well as how to 
interpret the results and make strategic decisions based on the results. 
 Mandate from Senior DoD Leadership. Mandates and standardized 
rules for certain decision processes in the DoD are required. For instance, 
any projects costing over $10 million will need a business case 
justification, and within that business case, certain elements must always 
exist, such as a tornado sensitivity analysis (which identifies the critical 
and key success factors within a project, the bottlenecks, and the risks), 
and each of these identified critical factors will need to be subject to some 
basic simulation by using ranges as inputs instead of single-point 
estimates. 
 Middle Leadership Training. Middle management and leadership need 
to understand more than senior management, as their job is to interpret 
the results for senior management while at the same time be able to take 
charge and manage the more junior analysts. 
 A Culture of Learning. The most successful organizations are those 
interested in change and willing to learn and adapt. The Integrated Risk 
Management techniques are detailed, vast, and varied, and certainly there 
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are aspects that are useful to all organizations and other aspects that may 
be less useful to one organization but more useful to another. Without the 
exposure and culture of embracing learning and change, it would be very 
difficult to make these risk management techniques successful in a 
company. 
 A Standardized Language of Risk. By implementing training sessions 
for all three levels (senior management, middle management, and junior 
staff), everyone will have a standardized language or lingo. For example, 
when the term “simulation” is used, everyone will understand what it 
means, what it is used for, and why it is required.  
 Standardized Toolset. To support the decision process, standardized 
toolsets such as those used in this research are a required software 
application for each person in the organization. This arrangement allows 
interchangeable and group collaboration on strategic decisions, where one 
staff member can replicate and run another’s models and come to the 
same conclusions.  
 A Centralized Strategic Risk Team. This team ideally reports indirectly 
or directly to the chief financial officer or president of the company so that 
it has exposure and credibility. The members of the team should be hand-
picked from the entire organization for their thought leadership and 
analytical capabilities. These individuals need to be properly trained in 
Integrated Risk Management, have experience implementing at least 
several projects, and make up the core of the strategic risk team. The 
purpose of this team is to provide advice to all analysts in the organization, 
and to be a gatekeeper or guardian of decision risk analytics, the go-to 
persons in the organization, and the people who will approve the business 
cases submitted over a certain threshold based on the mandate from 
senior management. In other words, they are the gatekeepers in a stage-
gate development and investment process, whereby a business case 
justification or proposal and request for investment will never reach senior 
management’s offices without first passing through this centralized team. 
 Work Cross-Functionally. Strategic risk management should never be 
confined to one department or business unit. That is, risk management is 
not the responsibility of just financial or economic analysts. Instead, most 
projects within an organization are cross-functional and involve multiple 
staff members from various departments and divisions from engineering to 
design to field commanders and senior military leadership. A cross-
functional team provides better subject matter experts and creates a 
diverse and rich view of the decisions and risks.  
 Nothing Beats Hands-On Experience. Never fully rely on consultants 
alone. Analysts and staff in an organization need to learn how certain risk 
management projects are executed, analyzed, and modeled. This in-
house knowledge provides the organization better control over the 
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decisions and reliability of the inputs and allows the process to be 
repeated. 
 Portfolio View. The entire organization should be viewed as a portfolio 
and each project or major decision should be viewed in the same way: on 
how it impacts the organization as a whole. For instance, certain projects 
that may seem unprofitable may actually be very profitable and strategic if 
viewed in a portfolio sense (e.g., options to expand, platform technology 
that can be used to springboard into other more profitable areas later on, 
sequential stage-gate options of a multiple phased investment or 
development). 
 
C. Criticisms, Caveats, and Misunderstandings in Real Options 
Before embarking on ROV analytics, analysts should be aware of several 
caveats. The following five requirements need to be satisfied before an ROV 
analysis can be run: 
 A financial model must exist. Real options analysis requires the use of an 
existing discounted cash flow model, as real options build on the existing 
tried-and-true approaches of current financial modeling techniques. If a 
model does not exist, it means that strategic decisions have already been 
made and no financial justifications are required, and, hence, there is no 
need for financial modeling or real options analysis.  
 Uncertainties must exist. If uncertainties do not exist, the option value is 
worthless. If everything is known for certain in advance, then a discounted 
cash flow model is sufficient. In fact, volatility (a measure of risk and 
uncertainty) is zero because everything is certain and the real options 
value is zero. In this case, the total strategic value of the project or asset 
reverts to the net present value in a discounted cash flow model.  
 Uncertainties must affect decisions when the firm is actively managing the 
project, and these uncertainties must affect the results of the financial 
model. These uncertainties will then become risks, and real options can 
be used to hedge the downside risk and take advantage of the upside 
uncertainties.  
 Navy leadership must have strategic flexibility or options to make 
midcourse corrections when actively managing acquisition projects. 
Otherwise, do not apply real options analysis when there are no options or 
management flexibility to value.  
 Navy management must be able to execute the options when it becomes 
optimal to do so. All the options in the world are useless unless they are 
executed appropriately—at the right time and under the right conditions.  
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There are also several criticisms against real options analysis. It is vital that 
the trained Navy ROV analyst understands what they are and how to respond to 
them.  
 Real options analysis is merely an academic exercise and is not practical 
in actual business applications. Nothing is further from the truth. Although 
it was true in the past that real options analysis was merely academic, 
many corporations have begun to embrace and apply real options 
analysis. Also, its concepts are very pragmatic, and with the use of the 
Real Options Super Lattice Solver software, even very difficult problems 
can be easily solved. This software has helped bring the theoretical a lot 
closer to practice. Firms are using it, and universities are teaching it. It is 
only a matter of time before real options analysis becomes part of 
standard financial analysis.  
 Real options analysis is just another way to bump up and incorrectly 
increase the value of a project to get it justified. Again, nothing is further 
from the truth. If a project has significant strategic options but the analyst 
does not value them appropriately, he or she is leaving money on the 
table. In fact, the analyst will be incorrectly undervaluing the project or 
asset. Also, one of the foregoing requirements states that one should 
never run real options analysis unless strategic options and flexibility exist. 
If they do not exist, then the option value is zero, but if they do exist, 
neglecting their valuation will grossly and significantly underestimate the 
project’s or asset’s value. 
 Real options analysis ends up choosing the highest risk projects, as the 
higher the volatility, the higher the option value. This criticism is also 
incorrect. The option value is zero if no options exist. However, if a project 
is highly risky and has high volatility, then real options analysis becomes 
more important. That is, if a project is strategic but is risky, then you need 
to incorporate, create, integrate, or obtain strategic real options to reduce 
and hedge the downside risk and take advantage of the upside 
uncertainties. Therefore, this argument is heading in the wrong direction. It 
is not that real options will overinflate a project’s value, but for risky 
projects, you should create or obtain real options to reduce the risk and 
increase the upside, thereby increasing the total strategic value of the 
project. Also, although an option value is always greater than or equal to 
zero, sometimes the cost to obtain certain options may exceed their 
benefits, making the entire strategic value of the option negative, although 
the option value itself is always zero or positive. Thus, it is incorrect to say 
that real options increase the value of a project or that only risky projects 
are selected. 
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People who make these criticisms do not truly understand how real options 
work. However, having said that, real options analysis is just another financial 
analysis tool, and the old axiom “garbage in, garbage out” still holds. But if care and 
due diligence are exercised, the analytical process and results can provide highly 
valuable insights. In fact, as previously stated, we believe that 50% (rounded, of 
course) of the challenge and value of real options analysis is simply thinking about it. 
Understanding that you have options, obtaining options to hedge the risks and take 
advantage of the upside, and to think in terms of strategic options is half the battle. 
Another 25% of the value comes from running the analysis and obtaining the results. 
The final 25% of the value comes from being able to explain the results to 
management, to your clients, and to yourself, such that the results become 
actionable intelligence that can be capitalized on, and not merely another set of 
numbers. 
D. Changing a Corporate Culture 
Advanced analytics (all the applications discussed in this research, including 
simulation, time-series forecasting, regression, optimization, and real options) are 
hard to explain to senior leadership. So, how do you get risk analysis accepted as 
the norm in an organization, especially when the DoD senior leadership is highly 
conservative? It is almost a guarantee in conservative organizations that an analyst 
showing senior leadership a series of fancy, mathematically complex, and 
computationally sophisticated models will be thrown out of the office together with 
his or her results and have the door slammed to boot. Changing leadership’s 
thinking is the topic of discussion in this section. Explaining results and convincing 
leadership and management appropriately go hand in hand with the characteristics 
of the advanced analytical tools, which, if they satisfy certain change-management 
requisites, improve the chances and the level of acceptance. 
As shown by the business cases and examples in this research project, it is 
certainly true that large multinationals have embraced the concept of risk and 
options analysis with significant fervor and that risk analysis is here to stay. It is not 
simply an academic exercise, nor is it the latest financial analysis fad that is here 
today and gone tomorrow. Nevertheless, change-management specialists have 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 117 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
found that there are several criteria to be met before a paradigm shift in thinking is 
found to be acceptable in an organization, even in the DoD. For example, in order 
for senior leadership and management to accept a new and novel set of advanced 
analytical approaches––simulation, forecasting, real options, and portfolio 
optimization––the models and processes themselves must have applicability to the 
problem at hand and not merely be an academic exercise. Figure 26 lists the criteria 
required for change (Mun, 2015).  
In addition to the process and methodology have to be consistent, accurate, 
and replicable, that is, they pass the scientific process. Given similar assumptions, 
historical data and assertions, one can replicate the results with ease and 
predictability. This replicability is especially true with the use of software programs 
described in this research article.  
 
Figure 26: Changing a Corporate Culture 
Next, the new method must provide a compelling value-added proposition. 
Otherwise, it is nothing but a fruitless and time-consuming exercise. The time, 
 Changing a Corporate Culture 
“No change of paradigm comes quickly” 
 
Criteria for instituting change: 
 
 Method Applicability 
 Not just an academic exercise 
 Accurate, Consistent, and Replicable 
 Creates a standard for decision-making 
 Value-added Propositions 
 Competitive advantage over competitors 
 Provide valuable insights otherwise unavailable 
 Exposition 
 Making the black box transparent 
 Explaining the value to senior management 
 Comparative Advantage 
 Better method than the old 
 It takes a good theory to kill an old one 
 Compatibility with Old Approach 
 Based on the old with significant improvements 
 Flexibility 
 Able to be tweaked 
 Covers a multitude of problems 
 External Influences 
 From “Main Street” to “Wall Street” 
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resources, and effort spent must be met and even surpassed by the method’s added 
value. This added value is certainly the case in larger capital investment initiatives, 
where a firm’s future or the future of a business unit may be at stake––incorrect and 
insufficient results may be obtained, and disastrous decisions made if risk analysis is 
not undertaken.  
Other major criteria include the ability to provide the user a comparative 
advantage over its competitors, which is certainly the case when the additional 
valuable insights generated through advanced risk analysis will help management 
identify options and value, prioritize, and select strategic and less risky alternatives 
that may otherwise be overlooked.  
Finally, in order to accept a change in mind-set, the new methodology, 
analysis, process, or model must be easy to explain and understand. In addition, 
there has to be a link to previously accepted methods, whether the new 
methodology is an extension of the old or a replacement of the old due to some clear 
superior attributes. These last two points are the most difficult to tackle for an 
analyst; the other criteria are comparatively direct and easy to define.  
The new set of risk analytics really is nothing but an extension of existing 
methodologies. This is especially true for Monte Carlo simulation where simulation 
cannot be applied unless there already is a spreadsheet model. Indeed, Monte Carlo 
simulation can be explained simply as scenario analysis applied to the nth degree. 
Simulation is nothing but scenario analysis done thousands of times but not just on a 
single variable (e.g., the three common scenarios: good economy, average 
economy, and bad economy complete with their associated probabilities of 
occurrence and payoffs at each state), rather, on multiple variables interacting 
simultaneously, where multiple variables are changing independently or 
dependently, in a correlated or uncorrelated fashion (e.g., competition, economy, 
market share, technological efficacy, and so forth). In fact, the results stemming from 
modern advanced analytics are simply a logical extension of the traditional 
approaches, as shown by Figure 27.  
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Figure 27: Simulation and Options (Logical Extension of Traditional Analysis) 
The static model in the illustration shows a revenue value of $2, cost of $1, 
and the resulting income value, which calculated as the difference between the two, 
is $1. Compare that to the dynamic model, where the same inputs are used but the 
revenue and cost variables have been subjected to Monte Carlo simulation. Once 
simulation has been completed, the dynamic model still shows the same single-point 
estimate of $1 as in the static model. In other words, adding in the more advanced 
analytics, namely, Monte Carlo simulation, the model or results have not changed. If 
management still wants the single-point estimate of $1 reported, then so be it. 
However, by logical extension, if both revenues and costs are uncertain, then by 
definition, the resulting income will also be uncertain. The forecast chart for the 
income variable shows this uncertainty of the resulting income with fluctuations 
around $1. In fact, additional valuable information is obtained using simulation, 
where the probability or certainty of breakeven or exceeding $0 in income is shown 
as 95.40% in Figure 27. In addition, rather than relying on the single-point estimate 
of $1, simulation reveals that the business only has 8.90% probability of exceeding 
the single-point estimate of $1 in income (Figure 28).  
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Figure 28: Probability Analysis to Capture Stochastic Real-World Outcomes 
If simulation is not applied here, the riskiness of this project will never be 
clearly elucidated. Imagine if management has multiple but similar types of projects 
where every project has a single-point estimate of $1. In theory, management should 
be indifferent in choosing any of these projects. However, if the added element of 
risk is analyzed, each project may have different probabilities of breakeven and 
different probabilities of exceeding the $1 income threshold. Clearly, the project with 
the least amount of risk should be chosen (i.e., highest probability of breakeven and 
exceeding the threshold value).  
Firms that are initially skeptical about applying advanced analytics in their 
decision-making activities should always consider first applying these new rules to 
smaller projects. Instead of biting off too much immediately, a small-scale project is 
always preferable. Companies new to advanced risk analytics should first learn to 
crawl before they start running and head straight for the wall. If management can be 
eased into the new analytical paradigm slowly, the transition will be more palatable.  
Having a vision to change the entire organization’s decision-making 
processes overnight is very admirable but will be very short-lived and bound for 
disaster. Before an organization can learn to make tomorrow’s forecast today, it has 
to learn from the lessons of yesterday. One approach is to look at high-profile 
projects in the past. Instead of starting with forecasting, perform some backcasting 
first. Instead of waiting for years to verify whether the results from the analysis were 
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actually correct or valuable, the results from a backcasting analysis are almost 
immediate. If the analyst is true to himself or herself, using the actual data coupled 
with the assumptions used in the past (without the advantage of hindsight), the new 
analytical results can then be compared to the decisions that were made to see if 
different strategies and decisions would have been undertaken instead. However, 
care should be taken as corporate politics come into play because the individuals 
who made the decisions in the past may not take it too kindly when their decisions 
are negatively scrutinized.  
No matter the strategy moving forward, one thing is certain. If senior 
management buys into the techniques, acceptance would be imminent. Otherwise, a 
few junior analysts in a cubicle somewhere trying to get management’s attention will 
fail miserably. In retrospect, a midlevel manager trying to impress his or her 
superiors without the adequate knowledge and support from analysts will not work 
either.  
The approach for successful implementation has to be comprehensive and 
three-pronged. Senior management must keep an open mind to alternatives. Middle 
management must keep championing the approach and not let minor setbacks be 
permanent, while attempting to be the conduit of information between the junior 
analysts and senior management. Finally, analysts should attempt to acquire as 
much knowledge about the techniques and applications as possible. The worst 
possible outcome is where extreme expectations are set from high above and the 
powers that be, while the lower rungs cannot deliver the goods as required. 
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